INQUIRY
MAGAZINE
DECEMBER 19, 1977 • $1.25

The Letelier Leaks, Charade in Belgrade

Uncommon Sense About the Soviet Union

Nat Hentoff: *Score One for the Press*

HOLIDAY BOOK ISSUE

HENRY NASH SMITH ON EDMUND WILSON • BARTON J. BERNSTEIN ON THE A-BOMB • ALAN RYAN • WALTER LAFEBER • *CHINESE SHADOWS* • *THE FABIANS* • DJILAS • SAMUEL JOHNSON • TOLKIEN • *ARTCULTURE* • DRUGS, SEX & PSEUDOSCIENCE

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It shouldn't hurt to be a child.

But sometimes it does. Each year a million children feel the pain of child abuse. And we can do something about it. If we all do just one thing, no matter how small, we can help prevent child abuse. Below are a few suggestions. Commit yourself to at least one and help stop the hurt.

I want to stop the hurt. (I'll check the commitment I've made and mail it in.)

- ☐ I'll show my child some love. (Sometimes I forget.)
- ☐ All I know about child abuse is hearsay. I'd like some facts. I'll mail in this coupon.
- ☐ I'll treat my child as a person, not a possession.
- ☐ I'll praise my children more often.
- ☐ I'll volunteer time to my local child abuse prevention organization. If there is none, I will try to start one.
- ☐ I'll spend more time with my children, starting tonight.
- ☐ I'll learn painless ways to tell my child "No".
- ☐ I'll learn the difference between discipline and abuse.
- ☐ I'll try to help a troubled family by being a foster parent for a while.
- ☐ I'll treat my children the way I wish I had been treated as a child.
- ☐ I have a problem. I'm going to start talking about it.
- ☐ I'll help a troubled parent. I'll be a friend and a good listener. After all, it shouldn't hurt to be a parent either.
- ☐ I'd like a one-year membership in the National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse. Enclosed is $10.00.

prevent child abuse.
write: Box 2866, Chi., IL 60690
National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____



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"I CONCEIVE," SAID THOMAS Carlyle, "that books are like men's souls, divided into sheep and goats." Some, he said, carry us up, heavenward, "forwarding the teaching of all generations." Others take us in the opposite direction, "doing ever the more and the wider and the wilder mischief." We bring you this information because this happens to be our holiday book issue, full, as you will discover, of small herds of both. We hope you will approve of the way we have shepherded each into its own pasture.

A new look at the sources of Soviet conduct

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RES PUBLICA

Of course he's concerned

■ To many human rights partisans, the reception accorded the shah already has been taken as proof that the administration is following a double standard. The administration, they charge, makes a big show of human rights concern when dealing with small, unimportant countries, but shoves its scruples into the background for nations whose business or cooperation it wants.

That charge is vigorously denied by administration officials. . . . State Department officials say that they have not received any allegations of torture within Iran in several months.

—Washington Post, Nov. 16, 1977

■ As night fell the White house floodlights (kept off usually these days to save energy) were turned outwards so the demonstrators could not see in. Inside President Carter toasted the Shah at a state dinner for his "enlightened" leadership.

—The Economist, Nov. 19, 1977

The letter of the law, and vice versa

■ The film-maker M. Ousmane Sembene, has protested the government ban on his film *Ceddo* in an open letter to the President. The controversy stems from M. Sembene's refusal to spell his film *Cedo* (soldiers), with a single "d" as required by a decree on the transcription of the dominant language, Wolof. As the single consonant transcription is enforceable by law, double consonants have become a symbol of Senegal's left-wing opposition.

—West Africa, Nov. 21, 1977

Therapeutic states I

■ A house-to-house sweep through the Atterbridgeville-Faulsville black township near Pretoria, supervised by helicopter, resulted in 625 detentions, including 198 children. The local police commissioner said 400 of the arrests were for violations of laws requiring blacks to carry an identity passbook. The children were detained to determine if they were "in need of care," he said.

—Wall Street Journal, Nov. 11, 1977

Therapeutic states II

■ A 20-year-old environmentalist, Anna, participated in an antinuclear demonstration in front of the nuclear center at Gösgen [Switzerland]. No incidents. Night having fallen, Anna remained alone, facing the plant, meditating. She wanted to exorcise the atomic demon. The police apprehended her; they found her bizarre. At the station, they had her undress. She refused to put on her clothes again, to drink, to eat, to speak. A psychiatrist decided to have her placed in the clinic at Bel-Air [where she was] subjected to six sessions of electroshock. . . .

A few days later, Anna escaped. . . . In Geneva, Anna, the atomic rebel, was retaken and once again locked up in the Bel-Air clinic. . . . "From the very beginning we were dealing with a sick woman," the Geneva psychiatrists maintained. "It is abnormal to want to exorcise an atomic plant."

—L'Express, Aug. 29, 1977

What they really meant to say

■ Official Ethiopian sources confirmed today that Lieut. Col. Atnafu Abate, nominally the second-ranking figure in the country's ruling military council, was subjected yesterday to "a revolutionary measure,"—a euphemism that in the past has meant execution.

—New York Times, Nov. 15, 1977

■ Ross H. Munro, the (Toronto) Globe and Mail correspondent in Peking, has been expelled by the Chinese Government. Yao Jan-liu, second secretary of the Chinese embassy in Canada, wrote a letter to the Globe and Mail saying that Mr. Munro's visa, scheduled to expire on Dec. 22, would not be renewed "due to obvious reasons."...

In recent weeks a series of articles by Mr. Munro on human rights in China has received worldwide notice.

—New York Times, Nov. 27, 1977

Some people never learn

■ One reason why terrorism has not been a threat to the United States, even when it has endured moments of political violence, is that the FBI is (or was) the greatest investigative law-enforcing agency in the world. We know its faults. We must watch it carefully. *Quis custodiet* . . . and all that. But one way of rooting out the evil of terrorism is to have your agents there among the real or potential terrorists, bugging, eavesdropping, keeping files on us. The guardians of society must be given weapons, if the stormtroopers are not to take to the streets.

—HENRY FAIRLIE *in the* New Republic, *Nov. 19, 1977*

Still more wisdom from the bench

■ A judge who sparked a controversy by calling nonwhite children "little pickaninnies" and ruling that they could not be adopted by white parents has been publicly censured by a judicial review board. . . . "It's great when they're little pickaninnies," he said. "They're cute and everybody's a do-gooder. But what about when they're older?"

—Washington Post, Oct. 29, 1977

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INQUIRIES

Egypt and Israel start talking

They did it without us

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR of November 22 ran a cartoon that shows a forsaken Jimmy Carter twiddling his thumbs and staring at a telephone that does not ring. At his knees are newspapers whose headlines emphasize the exclusion of the United States from the Begin-Sadat talks.

According to the *New York Times*, U.S. officials accepted Sadat's move grudgingly. Before Sadat's announcement that he would go to Jerusalem, the United States had been at the center of Middle East diplomacy. The Carter administration had been movinslowly toward a reconvening of the Geneva conference. As the mediator between the parties involved, the United States knew everything the various sides were telling each other.

After Sadat's unexpected announcement, one State Department official complained that Sadat and Begin were "unguided missiles." His choice of metaphor reveals how much the United States values its own guidance in recent years of Middle East diplomacy.

The *Times* also reported that some Carter administration officials feared that Sadat would open a parallel negotiating track in competition with American efforts to arrange a peace conference in Geneva.

These typically bureaucratic fears have not subsided. In a recent article on the decline of superpower influence, the *Christian Science Monitor* said that Egyptian diplomats felt they had detected an excessive "coolness" in the Carter administration toward Sadat's diplomatic initatives.

Sadat had earlier altered the dynamics of the Middle East conflict by substantially breaking up the links between the global superpower confrontation and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Before Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in July 1972, the bipolarity of the Arab-Israeli conflict matched the bipolar confrontation of the major great powers. Syria and the militarily more important Egypt were clients of the Soviet Union, while Israel was a client of the United States. Under these conditions, any settlement between the parties in the Middle East would also have to serve the purposes of both great powers.

At first glance, the new American support for Egypt that then followed seemed to guarantee that the United States would control subsequent negotiations. But it may turn out that the removal of the overt great-power confrontation from the Middle East scene allows the parties to negotiate on their own without great-power supervision. At the same time, the Middle East states can hope to pacify the United States by praising its efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to peace. The continued Carter administration stress on a Geneva conference, despite the newly uncooperative attitude of Syria, reflects the American desire to shape the emerging settlement instead of receiving praise for encouraging it.

It is of interest, then, that Sadat in his November 21 news conference in Jerusalem carefully repeated his position that "whenever we, the parties concerned, reach an agreement, no one, big power or small power, can prevent us from fulfilling it."

The Sadat visit could not satisfy the desire of the Palestinian Arabs for their own government, nor could it return the Palestinian refugees to their old homes. These central elements of the Palestinian question must be resolved if a just peace is to be achieved. But it may have helped defuse a conflict that could easily flare into a war–one that could involve the superpowers and quickly become a nuclear war.

We should not forget that on the night of October 23, 1973, after the United States had rejected Egyptian and Soviet suggestions of a joint Soviet-American task force to supervise the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire in the Suez region, the Nixon administration put U.S. forces around the world on standby alert.

No one should exaggerate the importance of Sadat's visit by thinking that it brought closer the substance of a just peace. But no one should discount the importance of this dramatic diplomatic breakthrough insofar as it lessens the stake and impact of the United States in Middle East developments. Only by ending the intrusions of the United States into this strife-torn region can we hope to avoid global nuclear confrontation.

The issue is self-determination

Imbroglio in Ogaden

THE MANEUVERING OF THE SUPERpowers in the Horn of Africa would be amusing were there not the possibility of tragic consequences. For years the United States supported Ethiopia as a "free world" nation, despite the fact that Emperor Haile Selassie was an absolute monarch who held large sections of the population in virtual slavery. Even after a secret Marxist-Leninist military junta overthrew Selassie in 1974, the United States continued to back Ethiopia as a counter to Somalia, the Soviet client next door. But last April, the junta ousted the American military advisers and turned toward Moscow. For a while this summer, the Carter administration flirted with the possibility of backing Somalia, still nominally a Soviet ally, in its conflict with Ethiopia. But that initiative was dropped when it became apparent that other African states looked with disfavor on any war that threatened established borders on the continent. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has suffered through the embarrassment of trying to support both sides in the war, only to have the Somalis eject them from the country.

It is no wonder that left and right alike in America have been strangely silent on the Ogaden war. By the usual criteria of these groups—which government is pro-Western, which is pro-Soviet, which democratic or dictatorial, which capitalist or socialist?—choosing up sides is a hopeless task. Lost in this confusion is the principle of justice at stake in the war.

At the end of World War II, Christian Ethiopia was granted dominion over the Italian colony of Eritrea, against the wishes of the largely Muslim Eritreans. In the east, Ethiopia was confirmed in its late nineteenth century conquest of the Somali-inhabited Ogaden.

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This burst of Ethiopian imperialism guaranteed that the country would be racked for decades by the struggles of the colonized peoples for independence. After more than 10 years of fighting, Eritrea is now largely in the hands of the guerrillas, while in the Ogaden, the Western Somali Liberation Front, backed by the army of neighboring Somalia, has conquered much of the desert region. This seems to us a just outcome, in keeping with the principle of self-determination.

But there is no assurance that great-power meddling will not reverse this result. We are pleased that, thus far, the United States has had the self-restraint to remain on the sidelines during the Ogaden war. Now that the Soviet Union and the Cubans are giving their undivided support to the Ethiopians, however, the temptation to intervene may become great. Newspaper reports indicate that the Ethiopians are preparing a major counteroffensive, which may overturn previous Somali victories. We would regret this outcome, but we would regret even more renewed American intervention. Justice is on the side of the Somalis and the Eritreans. But the United States (and the Soviet Union) cannot or should not seek to ensure justice everywhere. The superpowers should get out of the Horn of Africa and allow the indigenous peoples to work out their own destinies. ❑

Carter surrenders to industry

Propping up Big Steel

ELECTED LAST YEAR AS A SUP-porter of free trade, Jimmy Carter, in his first year at the White House, has presided over a headlong retreat into protectionism. Buckling under political pressure, he has sought measures to protect, among others, shoemakers, television manufacturers, shippers, and sugar growers. Now, after a long and noisy campaign highlighted this autumn by the shutdown of a number of aging plants, the steel industry and its friends in Congress have apparently convinced Carter to help them out too.

According to newspaper reports, the Carter administration has decided upon a plan to "solve" the so-called problem of steel imports. The preliminary design, submitted to the Cabinet last month by Under Secretary of the Treasury Anthony Solomon, would set up a system of reference prices for steel coming into the United States. Computed from the estimated costs of production of the most efficient foreign steelmakers, the Japanese, the reference figures would establish a floor under steel prices: Any importer who tried to sell below the reference prices would be liable to financial penalties imposed by the federal government. Most likely, this floor will be at a level just below current domestic steel prices, eliminating the price advantage that Japanese and European steelmakers have used to gain 15 percent of the American market from the less efficient and less modern U.S. steel industry.

The American steel companies are upset because the domestic market for steel is stagnant this year, and foreign steelmakers are taking business that the American firms would like to have. They claim that Japanese and European firms are competing "unfairly" by underselling domestic producers at prices less than the full cost of production. The U.S. steelmakers are partially correct: Foreign firms are indeed selling in the American market at prices less than full cost. But this is an irrelevant issue. The big American steel firms are not concerned ultimately about the price of foreign steel versus its cost; what bothers them is that the Japanese and Europeans have won a slice of the U.S. domestic market. They would be equally disturbed if the challenge came from new, more efficient American companies. At least once in the past, during the Depression, when the smaller firms in the industry were able to take a share of the market from Big Steel, the major steel companies were able to get the federal government to protect them by fixing prices. Now, Carter seems willing to lend them similar protection against competition, this time from abroad.

The Carter administration plan, as we see it, is bad economics. It will mean higher prices for steel and, hence, for almost all products Americans buy. Moreover, it will deprive consumers of a bargain: By selling steel here at less than full cost, the Europeans and Japanese are making us a gift that we would be foolish to refuse. The administration's plan will also eliminate the most effective check upon the domestic steel industry. Without the stimulus of competition, the industry has no incentive to modernize its old and inefficient plants, increase productivity, or hold down labor costs. It will be a "sick" industry forever, requiring government bail-outs and extorting high prices from consumers.

The Carter plan is also bad policy. By giving the federal government the power to set a floor price for steel, the plan will hand Jimmy Carter a tool sought by presidents since the days of Franklin Roosevelt: the power to control steel prices. Where once a president could only "jawbone" about steel prices, Carter will have, in addition to words, the ability to vary the reference prices and thus regulate the volume of imports. The steel companies, which have so often done battle with the White House, should be wary of this power. And the rest of us, who have so often seen presidents use their discretionary economic powers for political purposes, should think long and hard before we put any more power into the hands of a man who bows before every breeze. ❑

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FIRST AMENDMENT WATCH

NAT HENTOFF

Score one for the press

AT OUR LAST MEETING, THE First Amendment rights of journalists were being dangled over the edge of a precipice by a three-judge panel of the prestigious Second Circuit Court of Appeals (for New York, Connecticut, and Vermont). Although the case had not attracted much national attention, the chronically apprehensive community of First Amendment lawyers were watching it grimly, fearing the worst.

Colonel Anthony Herbert had sued CBS, Barry Lando (a producer for "60 Minutes"), Mike Wallace (a correspondent for the same program), and the *Atlantic Monthly* for $344 million worth of defamation damages. His reputation, he said, had been grievously injured by a segment of "60 Minutes" devoted to debunking his alleged achievements as an exposer of war crimes in Vietnam. Lando, moreover, had written a piece for the *Atlantic* on how he had gone about this muckraking work, so the magazine was also a target of Herbert's libel suit.

Since Colonel Herbert is, in law, a public figure, it is much harder for him to win a libel suit than if he were an ordinary, anonymous citizen. Under a series of Supreme Court rulings, a public official or a public figure must not only prove the falsity of what was printed or broadcast about him. The plaintiff must also demonstrate convincingly that the offending journalist either knew he was dealing with untruths as he wrote or that he went ahead with reckless disregard as to whether his material was true or false. The Supreme Court's rationale is that we will not be able to have sufficiently robust debate about public issues unless it is tough for a public figure to win damages when he becomes infuriated at something written or broadcast about him.

What distinguishes the Herbert suit from all previous libel actions is a legal maneuver made even before the case came to trial. During pretrial procedures, Herbert's lawyers asked the court to compel CBS producer Barry Lando to answer certain questions concerning his "beliefs, opinions, intent and conclusions" in preparing the program at issue. After all, said Herbert's attorneys, if we have to prove that CBS deliberately proceeded to demolish Herbert by distorting the record through selective investigation and one-sided interviewing, we have to get inside the head of the man responsible for putting the program together.

Therefore, Lando was to be forced to tell why he interviewed certain people and not others; what conclusions he came to about the veracity of the people he interviewed; what he and Mike Wallace talked about in deciding what to include and what to leave out; and the nature of the thought processes by which Lando assembled the final piece which treated Herbert so harshly.

The federal district judge agreed with Colonel Herbert's lawyers. Recognizing, however, that so sweeping a "discovery" process had never been mounted against journalists before, he stopped the pretrial proceedings until an immediate appeal of his ruling could be made to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

The relatively few print and broadcast journalists who were paying attention to what was going on had been stunned by the lower court ruling. If it were upheld, every time a reporter started digging into a controversial story, he would be conscious of the real possibility that at some indeterminate date in the future, he might have to present, for a court record, all his doubts, changing perspectives, and other ambivalences endemic to the newsgathering process. He would now have an ultimate editor, one who was much more of a pain in the ass than his regular editor: a judge. And a judge, moreover, who could bankrupt him.

THOSE OF US WAITING TO HEAR what had happened in oral arguments before the Second Circuit last September were dismayed by the news. Only one of the three judges seemed to comprehend that a verdict in favor of Colonel Herbert on this crucial point would create such rampant uncertainty in the press that, henceforth, public figures and public officials could effectively intimidate their critics by threatening them with total "discovery" of their thought processes every time they wrote or broadcast a particularly abrasive piece.

Happily, the three-judge panel decided by a 2–1 vote, on November 7, 1977, that Herbert was indeed asking for nothing less than the scuttling of the First Amendment as it applies to journalists. A delighted lawyer in the case has called this "one of the great First Amendment decisions—breathtaking in its scope." And so it may be unless it is eventually overturned by the Supreme Court.

To begin with, Chief Judge Irving Kaufman made more specific than ever before the First Amendment protections that attend the evolution of a piece of reporting. "If we were to allow selective disclosure of how a journalist formulated his judgments on what to print or what not to print," Kaufman said, "we would be condoning judicial review of the editor's throught processes. Such an inquiry, which on its face would be virtually boundless, endangers a constitutionally protected realm, and unquestionably puts a freeze on the free interchange of ideas within the newsroom.

"A reporter or editor," Kaufman continued, "aware that his thoughts might have to be justified in a court of law, would often be discouraged and dissuaded from the creative verbal testing, probing, and discussion of hypotheses and alternatives which are the *sine qua non* of responsible journalism."

INDEED, "FACED WITH THE POSsibility of such an inquisition, reporters . . . would be reluctant to express their doubts. They would be chilled in the very process of thought."

The decision, if it holds, is not only immensely useful in preventing attorneys for future libel plaintiffs from poking around inside reporters' heads, but it may also have other applications.

"I've had a number of cases," a prominent First Amendment lawyer told me after the Court of Appeals decision, "in which a reporter's notes have been subpoenaed. We did not want to produce those notes. They were not based on confidential sources, but we still didn't want to produce them on the basis that all reporters' notes are by their very nature confidential. Why? Because they show what the reporter was thinking.

"I'll give you an example," the lawyer continued. "Recently a reporter was ordered by a court to turn over his notes on an interview he had done with a cop. The move was made by a defendant who wanted to show he had been arrested improperly by that cop. We resisted the order because, again, the notes would show what the reporter was thinking at that stage of preparing the story. We lost, just as I usually lose when I try to use the First Amendment as a bar to forcing a journalist to turn over his notes. Confidential sources are something else. Some of those you win, some you lose. But I have been trying for years to get First Amendment protection for *all* reporters' notes.

"Now," the lawyer went on, "I'll be able to say to a judge, 'Look, here is this Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision that says judges cannot review a journalist's thought processes. You must quash the order requiring my client to hand over his notes, for otherwise you will be inhibiting the editorial process.' I think that with this decision, that argument is going to work—and throughout the country, as well, because the

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Second Circuit has a lot of prestige and, being situated in the center of publishing activity, has more experience in First Amendment cases than other circuits."

In addition to the Kaufman decision, the Herbert case produced an important concurring opinion by Judge James Oakes, also of the Second Circuit. In the conviction that the Herbert case "breaks new ground in an area of utmost importance," Oakes decided to further strengthen the First Amendment protections of the editorial process.

WHAT OAKES HAS DONE IS TO build on a theory advanced by Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart in a speech at Yale Law School a few years ago. There has been an evolving recognition by the Supreme Court, said Oakes, that the press has "special status" in our governmental system and that means there is a "structural, institutional differentiation between freedom of speech and freedom of the press."

In other words, the First Amendment protects the freedom of speech of *individuals*. But the free press clause in the same amendment, Potter Stewart has emphasized, "extends protection to an institution. The publishing business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection." After all, "If the free press guarantee meant no more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy."

Therefore—since the Constitution protects the *institutional* autonomy of the press—Judge Oakes continued, "To the extent that the independent exercise of editorial functions is threatened by governmental action, the very foundations of the architectural masterpiece that is our form of government are shaken, the supporting columns weakened."

But this is a libel suit, occurring after that section of "60 Minutes" was broadcast. It is in no way a question of prior restraint, of censorship. That doesn't matter, said Oakes. The time at which governmental intrusion occurs "should not—it cannot—matter." In this instance, the discovery order is so broad as to chill "the free interchange of ideas within the newsroom," and therefore the crucial need for editorial independence has been just as jeopardized as if the lower court had prevented the broadcast from being shown.

In sum, the government—that is, the court—is prevented by the First Amendment from compelling Barry Lando to tell what went on in his mind as he researched and put together the "60 Minutes" segment on Anthony Herbert. Judge Oakes could not be more clear: "As soon as facts are set in their context, there is editorial selection; as soon as that process is subject to scrutiny, there is a suppression effect; and as soon as there is such an effect, the freedom of the press has evaporated."

The free press guarantee accords special institutional status to the editorial process which, therefore, cannot be messed with—even in a libel suit by a public figure bearing the heavy burden of proving that a journalist knowingly disseminated falsehood or broadcast it with reckless disregard of whether he was dealing with truth or lies.

IN A VALUABLE FOOTNOTE, Judge Oakes extended his remarks on the issue of when governmental interference with editorial functions violates the Constitution. Everyone agrees that "prior restraint" is such an instance; but, he adds, "Supreme Court cases indicate that meddling with press freedoms *after* the printing or programming has occurred operates as a 'prior restraint' on *future* editorial decisions by virtue of the chilling effect created by that interference." (Emphases added.)

Both the Kaufman decision and the Oakes concurring opinion are indeed among the strongest and clearest affirmations of press rights in the recent history of this most basic branch of constitutional law. And their further effect may be to curb another chilling effect on the press that comes from libel suits in general.

One of the peculiar elements of the Herbert case so far has been that although CBS balked at having Herbert's lawyers march all the way inside the producer's head, the network had already turned over an extraordinary amount of material to these attorneys. Included, the *New York Times* observed, were "reporters' notes, network memorandums, drafts and . . . much of the unused film connected with the program."

WHY DID CBS YIELD SO much? The Court of Appeals decision would have enabled CBS to successfully resist handing over much of what it already has, since a sizable amount of that material also involves the editorial process, although it does not go so closely into beliefs, opinions, and intent.

The answer to this unsettling prior decision by CBS may be obtained from a statement by Richard Salant, president of CBS News. Salant, once a corporate lawyer for the network, now thinks like a newsman, and he says that he opposed the turning over of so much material. Salant was overruled by the company's corporate lawyers, who feared the case would be lost if CBS did not show its "good faith" by revealing at least some of the inner dynamics that were involved in the production of the "60 Minutes" segment on Colonel Herbert. The indications are that if Herbert's lawyers had not pushed too far, this case could have been a grave defeat for the press precisely because CBS yielded so much before it decided its back was against the wall.

Now, with the Court of Appeals decision supporting the First Amendment with enormously greater fervor than CBS's corporate law team had mustered, press defendants in the future can discard the damaging "good faith" precedent set by CBS earlier in this case. Instead, they can choose to stand on the Second Circuit decision by refusing to give over anything that discloses, in Judge Kaufman's phrase, "how a journalist formulated his judgments on what to print or not to print."

It should be no surprise, by the way, that the action in the Court of Appeals was not handled by CBS's corporate law division but rather by Floyd Abrams, the nation's leading First Amendment lawyer—who came in, like Paladin, to rescue journalists' rights both from the lower court as well as from CBS's corporate attorneys.

In any case, if the Supreme Court either refuses to review the Court of Appeals decision or upholds it on review, this surely will have been a "breathtaking" advance in nourishing the free press clause of the First Amendment.

"What troubles me," says Floyd Abrams, "is that relatively little press and broadcast attention has been given this case. It's another indication that not many journalists and editors really know when the First Amendment is in danger."

But that, too, is part of the history of the First Amendment.

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DISPATCH

DOYLE MCMANUS

Shadowboxing in Belgrade

THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT, almost accidently, contributed to real ferment over human and civil rights in Eastern Europe. But it was not meant to be so; the signers of the Helsinki Final Act at the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) saw the document as a touchstone of détente, not a weapon of anti-Soviet agitation. The 300-odd diplomats who have gathered in Belgrade for a three-month "review" of the Final Act still see it that way. The Belgrade conference, despite the fanfare the meeting received in the United States as a Soviet-American showdown, is not about human rights. It is about détente, about the political structure of Europe, and about what the delegates call "the continuity of the CSCE process," a minor diplomatic industry in which the "humanitarian concerns" of the Final Act are merely the least orderly part.

This should not be surprising, for the wind has gone out of the sails of Jimmy Carter's campaign for human rights, and the calm is felt as much in Belgrade as in Washington. At Belgrade, as at Helsinki, the superpowers are conscious of the larger issues between them. Although the official American position is that "the pursuit of détente and our concern for human rights are inseparable," the drive for a SALT agreement has taken the power from Carter's earlier campaign for human rights. "President Carter," said a British delegate at the conference, cheerfully mixing metaphors, "has other big fish in other ponds." Though the American delegates still attempt to underline, for home consumption, their commitment to human rights, much of the Belgrade conference has been reduced—in the words of that same puckish British diplomat—to "shadowboxing."

The chief American shadowboxer is Arthur Joseph Goldberg, former Supreme Court justice, labor secretary, AFL-CIO lawyer, and eminent liberal. Although he served a term as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Goldberg is a newcomer to the arcane world of CSCE. To the quiet professional diplomats at the Belgrade meeting, many of whom have been working on CSCE for five years and more, his appointment as chief of the U.S. delegation was something of a mystery.

In the spring, when President Carter's human rights campaign was in the headlines and Belgrade loomed as a test of wills with the Soviets, the administration had said it planned to send the deputy secretary of state, Warren Christopher, to the meetings. Now, American delegates say that Goldberg is "more visible"; and indeed, the former justice, although a bit slowed by age, is one of the few genuine personalities at the conference. But European delegates, both Eastern and Western, wonder—despite Goldberg's habit of dropping Carter's name—just how influential he is in Washington.

The American delegate's style has also left the discreet drafters of the Final Act somewhat baffled. Goldberg's opening speech, a Swiss delegate said, "sounded like something for the Democratic National Convention or a labor meeting." When Northwestern University law Professor Joyce Hughes, a black "public member" of the delegation, was assigned to deliver a statement on Soviet interference with international mail, a Yugoslav delegate privately scolded his American friends: "That sort of thing may impress your own people, but it's rather silly here. We can put Gypsies and Albanians on the podium, but I don't think it would serve any purpose."

Unlike the professional diplomats, Goldberg appears to direct his speeches toward the press as much as toward the foreign ministries. He has called a half-dozen news conferences, several solely to rebut negative news stories—including one that correctly reported that his staff was chafing under his abrasive leadership.

ABOVE ALL, GOLDBERG HAS taken special pains to appear tough on the issue of human rights. In response to the repeated question of when the United States planned to confront the Soviet Union with individual human rights cases, he has promised, "We will name names in the appropriate forum."

But by mid-November, he had "named names" only twice—in references to the Prague trial of Czech dissidents (which was conducted at the same time as the conference); to several American journalists expelled from or denied entry to Czechoslovakia; and to Anatoly Shcharansky, Yuri Orlov and Aleksandr Ginzburg, the three imprisoned leaders of Moscow's unofficial Helsinki monitoring group—and that only after it was clear that being specific would not provoke a Soviet walkout.

Still, there is no doubt that Goldberg is personally, emotionally committed to pressing the issue. When, in October, the KGB briefly detained Aleksandr Podrabinek—another member of the Moscow monitoring group—Goldberg considered the action a calculated affront to the conference, and his staff and other delegates had to argue him out of taking the floor immediately to confront the Russians with the case.

He has toughened up several statements which the State Department tried to weaken, and then departed from the final, Washington-approved text for broader denunciations of political oppression.

On the other hand, Goldberg's social-

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democratic roots have occasionally led him down strange paths; he has congratulated the Soviet Union on its success in furnishing citizens the "rights" of employment, housing and medical care.

*BUT THE RUSSIANS HAVE SUC*cessfully avoided answering Goldberg's charges, or those of Canada, France, and the Netherlands. The Soviet Union's strategy at Belgrade is simple: The conference should not be devoted to mutual recriminations over violations of the provisions of the 1975 accord, but instead to "constructive efforts" to strengthen the fabric of détente.

This has always been the view of the superpowers. It was originally the smaller powers who most diligently promoted the Helsinki Final Act, and the smaller powers—not the United States—who wrote and enacted its human rights provisions. The United States supported the Western European demands, but did not take the initiative; Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was skeptical about the whole CSCE idea, and thought of the agreement largely as a gift to Moscow, to be traded for Russian concessions. The pact was, after all, Brezhnev's idea. The Europeans, on the other hand, were vitally interested in CSCE as a framework for a multilateral, all-European détente that would not depend on the vicissitudes of U.S.-Soviet relations. They saw the Helsinki accord as one way to reduce the superpowers' domination of East-West diplomacy.

At one point, Kissinger actually agreed with the Russians to dump the entire human rights section in order to get the signing of the agreement out of the way. The "fix" was blocked, to Kissinger's annoyance, by the Western Europeans' flat refusal to cooperate.

Hence, in the Final Act, there appear both the general commitment to human rights and the specific requirements that states grant exit visas for citizens who wish to join relatives abroad or marry a citizen of another country; increase their citizens' access to foreign publications; remove restrictions on foreign journalists; and increase educational, cultural, and scientific exchanges. Henry Kissinger considered these measures toothless. But West German, Swiss, and other officials closer to the concrete problems of emigration and family reunification saw the agreement differently. And, as it turned out, so did dissidents and civil rights activists in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania.

But the Belgrade conference will be of no help to them. While the superpowers shadowbox, the Swiss and most other smaller nations of Europe—to whom the Helsinki agreement belongs, if it belongs to anybody—largely have forsaken the nondebate over human rights, concentrating on matters where the Belgrade conference may actually improve on Helsinki. For aid in easing their lot, the Eastern European dissidents had best look elsewhere, too. ❑

MEDIA

JOHN HANRAHAN

Who leaked the Letelier documents?

JUST AS THEY DID IN THE BAD old days before the multitudinous crimes of the FBI and CIA were revealed, prominent segments of the press are again allowing themselves to be used for campaigns of disinformation by elements of the intelligence community.

A recent target of such a "black propaganda" campaign was Orlando Letelier, the former Socialist Chilean Cabinet officer who, along with an American colleague, Ronni Moffitt, was murdered when their car was bombed along Embassy Row in Washington, D.C., on September 21, 1976. In the succeeding months, copies of letters, notebooks, lists of phone numbers and addresses, and other documents in the briefcase Letelier had with him at the time of his death found their way into the hands of journalists—many of them with close ties to the intelligence community—both in the United States and abroad.

Reports based on the leaked documents have appeared in syndicated columns by Jack Anderson, Evans and Novak, and William F. Buckley; in news articles by Jeremiah O'Leary of the *Washington Star*; in a publication of the *Economist* of London; in the John Birch Society magazine, *American Opinion*; in the government-controlled press of Chile; and in the newsletter of the Chilean junta's lobby in the United States.

The briefcase material also was obtained by Accuracy in Media. AIM, a right-wing organization whose purpose is to attack what it sees as the "liberal" bias in the nation's news media, in turn, according to its officials, passed on copies to various other publications and organizations—many of them on the political far right.

The various reports strongly suggested, or flatly stated, that the documents showed that Letelier, who served in the government of Salvador Allende (who was overthrown and killed in 1973), was a Soviet or Cuban agent and, therefore, got what he deserved. It was a classic case of blaming the victim for his own fate, or of turning the victim into a criminal suspect. Some of the reports also used other leaks to attempt to show that it was rightist Cuban exiles acting alone, or even leftist Chileans, rather than the junta's secret police (the National Intelligence Directorate, or DINA, as it was called then) who were responsible for killing Letelier.

THE UNQUESTIONING USE OF the documents by the junta's lobbyists and the right-wingers was to be expected. But the performance of the more Establishment journalists—especially O'Leary, Anderson, and Evans and Novak—who never bothered to examine the leaks or the motives of the leakers, was not. It showed, more than anything else, that we haven't come any distance at all since the days when J. Edgar Hoover played for journalists tape recordings of bugs used against Martin Luther King, Jr., and otherwise leaked material to attack people he didn't like.

Instead of trying to find out who was attempting to undermine the Letelier investigation, these journalists chose instead to give prominence to material that showed nothing more than that the socialist Letelier had friends and acquaintances in Cuba, East Germany, and the United States who could be variously described as leftists, radicals, communists, socialists or Marxists—a fact that is hardly surprising considering that Letelier had served in a popularly elected government which included socialists of various descriptions.

Most of the reports based on the leaks stressed that the documents showed Letelier was getting Cuban funds—that is, money passed on to him by Beatriz Allende, who fled from Chile to Cuba after her father was overthrown and murdered. Associates of Letelier at the Institute for Policy Studies (a Washington think-tank where Letelier was director of the Transnational Institute) and Beatriz Allende herself, in a letter to the *Washington Post*, said that the money in her possession had been gathered in various countries from people opposed to the Chilean junta. The funds were then forwarded to Allende's daughter, who was treasurer for the exiled Unidad Popular, the coalition that governed Chile before Allende's overthrow. She then distributed the money to Letelier and other Chilean exiles in various countries to assist them in the antijunta efforts.

But even if the columns based on the materials in Letelier's briefcase "followed the darkest possible interpretation of the scanty material" (as Lee Lescaze concluded last February in a *Washington Post* article after he was given access to the original documents by Ms. Letelier), the Anderson, Evans and Novak, and O'Leary reports clearly put supporters of Letelier on the defensive.

As one former CIA agent who is knowledgeable in the use of "black propaganda" by intelligence agencies told me, the leak of

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the Letelier briefcase material was "a classic example of a campaign of disinformation. It diverted attention from the real issue of who murdered Letelier, and instead focused attention on Letelier's socialist politics. It's beautiful because you can't really answer it. It plants the idea in people's minds that if this socialist was getting foreign communist money, then he got what he deserved."

*EVANS AND NOVAK WERE ESPE-*cially vitriolic in their column on the briefcase contents on February 16. In a column liberally sprinkled with the usual Evans and Novak epithets ("radical-left," "radical," "left-wing," "Marxist," "socialist," "communist"), the columnists attempted to show that some of Letelier's "funds from Cuba" helped finance part of a trip to Mexico by another old target of Evans and Novak, Congressman Michael J. Harrington of Massachusetts. The columnists said that $174.26 of the money sent to Letelier by Beatriz Allende had helped finance Harrington's trip. Evans and Novak then, without supplying any evidence, contended the Kremlin was masterminding Letelier's antijunta human-rights campaign, writing:

"What's more, confidential papers that Letelier, foreign minister in Chile's Marxist Allende regime, carried around with him show frequent correspondence (addressed to 'comrades') with East Berlin and Havana. His personal telephone book lists Julian Rizo, Cuban spy based at the UN.

"Since East German and Cuban police activities are now intertwined with the Soviet KGB, the Kremlin's hand was behind Letelier's campaign to promote Chilean 'human rights' on Capitol Hill. Mike Harrington's unwitting acceptance of Cuban expense money is only a particularly embarrassing instance of idealistic liberal congressmen manipulated by the dashing, handsome Letelier."

Jack Anderson's column of December 20, 1976, the first to break the news of Letelier's briefcase, also was the first to tell of the letter from Allende's daughter which informed Letelier he would receive payments of $1,000 a month. The column, written by Anderson associate Les Whitten, suggested that Letelier "had been leading a strange double life."

William F. Buckley, himself an acknowledged former CIA agent, wrote in early April that the Letelier affair raised such questions as "Is there an illegal traffic in Cuban money in the U.S., and if so, what is it subsidizing?" Buckley lamented the passing of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, writing that "in better days, the documents would have been subpoenaed" by that committee and hearings held—in other words, an investigation of the victim rather than the murderers.

Buckley wanted an investigation of the victim, rather than of the murderers.

The Buckley column, like many of the other columns and news reports, was strangely silent on the murder itself. By the time it appeared, other newspapers had already reported that the federal prosecutors conducting a grand jury investigation had gathered strong evidence to show that Letelier had been murdered by right-wing Cubans acting in conjunction with the DINA. Yet for some reason, Buckley and other commentators on the leaks seemed unconcerned that secret police of another nation may have come into the U.S. capital city and have murdered a former foreign official and an American citizen.

Jeffrey Hart, a Dartmouth College professor and writer for Buckley's *National Review*, went beyond even Buckley and Evans and Novak in an April 25 column: "You are not hearing much about it from the media, but Letelier was a Communist agent, a revolutionary leading a double life." The letters to people in East Germany and Cuba were upgraded by Hart as revealing "Letelier's connection to a network of Communist agents here and abroad." Hart's column, interestingly enough, has passages that follow almost verbatim sections from *Foreign Report*, published by the *Economist* newspaper of London on March 2.

*IN ADDITION TO THE LETELIER-*was-a-Communist-agent-and-got-what-he-deserved angle, there were other themes in various news reports and columns based on intelligence leaks other than the briefcase documents. In a rush to judgment on the then three-week-old assassination, *Newsweek*, in the Periscope column in its October 11, 1976, issue, said that "the CIA has concluded that the Chilean secret police were not involved in the death" of Letelier. O'Leary, in the October 8, 1976 *Washington Star*, reported that "it was made known yesterday that the probers are not ruling out the theory that Letelier might just as well have been killed by leftist extremists to create a martyr as by rightist conspirators."

INQUIRY

A notice to our subscribers

A number of readers have informed us that *INQUIRY* has been arriving in their hands rather late, and occasionally in poor condition. New publications frequently have difficulty with the Postal Service, and unfortunately, *INQUIRY* has had more than its share. The normal problems have been compounded by our appearance at the busy mailing season.

We expect that these stumbling blocks will be overcome shortly. Meanwhile, we will do all we can to remedy the situation. You can help us in two ways. If you don't receive your issue within two days of the cover date, please let us know immediately, and we will lodge a complaint with the appropriate postal officials. In addition, if your copy reaches you in badly damaged condition, drop us a note. We will send you, by first class mail, another copy.

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The October 12, 1976, *New York Times* quoted "administration intelligence officials" as saying that Cuban exiles probably killed Letelier. There was no mention of the DINA. The American newsletter of the junta's registered lobbying arm reported on October 25, 1976, that Letelier's killers "may have been either virulently anti-Castro Cuban terrorists, or ultraleft Chilean Marxist extremists." O'Leary was back at it last April with an article that mentioned the Left and the DINA as possible suspects, but concluded "there is strong reason to believe" that the Cuban exiles were the main target of the probe. Clearly, the intelligence sources cited in these various reports were attempting to exonerate the DINA in Letelier's death—despite the evidence cited in stories in other newspapers linking both DINA and some Cuban exiles to the murder.

Exactly who leaked the Letelier documents is not known. What is known is that the briefcase containing the documents was confiscated by District of Columbia police shortly after the murders and was then turned over to the FBI, which later returned it to Letelier's widow, Isabel. None of the critics of the leaks believes the documents were leaked to the press by the District of Columbia police, because that department lacks the contacts and resources to conduct an international campaign against Letelier. Assuming that neither the reporters who received the documents nor some other intelligence agency did a black-bag job on the FBI, a reasonable assumption is that someone in the FBI made the initial leak.

Ralph Stavins and Saul Landau of the Institute for Policy Studies said information that they have received indicates that the leaks most likely came from the FBI's intelligence division, with members of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers serving as conduits for the information. The apparent goal, Stavins said, was not only to smear Letelier but to "contain" the investigation—just as was done with the original Watergate probe—so that the Cuban exiles alone would be blamed for the murders.

The Justice Department denies that it or the FBI leaked the documents. Department spokesman Bob Stevenson said he had been told by "a reporter I trust" who had obtained the documents that the leak had not come from the FBI or Justice. But Stevenson said he couldn't comment on the likelihood that the FBI leaked the documents to an intermediary or intermediaries who in turn passed on the documents to various journalists.

David A. Phillips, head of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, said in an interview that although he obviously could not speak for every member of his organization, it was "absolutely untrue" that the group itself had received or passed on the documents. Had such documents come into the association's possession, he said, "We certainly would not have disseminated them."

NONE OF THOSE WHO RECEIVED copies of the briefcase documents who were interviewed by this reporter would name their source. Robert Novak, after asking for written questions to be submitted through an aide, declined as a matter of general policy to discuss the source or motive for the leak, as did Whitten for the Anderson column. Reed Irvine of AIM, who said AIM obtained copies of the documents after Anderson, Evans and Novak, and O'Leary had published their reports, said his organization and O'Leary got their copies from the same source. He said O'Leary himself had not passed on the documents, "but I believe we have copies of what O'Leary has." Irvine—who, we should not forget, works for an organization that calls itself Accuracy in Media—said he knew the source of the original leaks, "but won't tell you. It's irrelevant for our purposes."

Perhaps the most tantalizing answer so far comes from Jeremiah O'Leary, who wrote several stories based on the leaked documents for the *Washington Star*. By all accounts O'Leary has been extremely close to both the FBI and CIA. The *Star* itself has acknowledged this closeness. In an apparent effort to lay to rest rumors that O'Leary was one of the reporters who had been CIA agents or informants, the *Star* published an article on CIA-hired journalists in its November 30, 1973, edition, noting that O'Leary was one of many reporters on various publications who "maintain contact with CIA officials in the routine performance of their journalistic duties."

In an interview O'Leary said the leaked Letelier material most definitely did not come to him from either agency, but came instead from another "official" source. He said he did not receive the documents from the lawyer holding the original documents, the District of Columbia Police Department, the Justice Department, or the State Department. He added, however, that it was probably fair to assume that someone in the FBI had made the original leaks, and that the CIA probably also had copies. He speculated that Evans and Novak and Anderson had received their copies from someone on Capitol Hill (who initially had received it from someone else) because "that's where they have their strongest sources."

It may be that the leaks in the Letelier case have not deflected the investigation, as was feared by Isabel Letelier, Landau, Stavins, and other colleagues of the murdered Chilean official and Ronni Moffitt. Press accounts in early September of this year said again that the U.S. attorney's investigation was moving closer to a conclusion that DINA and some Cuban exiles collaborated in the murders. Still, the case of the leaked Letelier documents is cause for concern. What it shows, unfortunately, is that much of the U.S. press is still only too willing to carry water for unscrupulous intelligence operatives, who, in the sordid tradition of the late J. Edgar Hoover, are still only too happy to let them do it. ❑

EDUCATION

DIANE DIVOKY

Handicapping the classroom

IN THE DENVER SCHOOLS, KIDS aren't just kids anymore, they're numbers. A "normal functioning" student is only a 1.0, but a "slow learner," a "gifted student," or a "transient" is rated at 1.5; a child with "significantly limited intellectual capacity" or one who is a "disciplinary problem" earns a 2.0, and one with "identifiable perceptual and communicative disorders" gets a 2.5. Also claiming 2.5s are the "emotionally disturbed," the "hyperactive," and the "non-English speaking."

The kids are assigned their labels and accompanying numbers as part of a teachers' union scheme that weights students by their degree of "instructional difficulty" and provides "special help" for teachers accordingly. Under the plan, part of the Denver Classroom Teachers Association's contract with the city's school board since last year, each teacher sits down at the end of the first month of school and gives one of 14 available labels and a corresponding number weight to each student.

A 'normal functioning' student is a 1.0, but a 'slow learner' or a 'gifted student' is rated at 1.5.

So that teachers can sort out all their problems and pin the right label on the right child, there's a list, which turns out to consist of tautological descriptions. For example, how does a teacher know if a child who's not doing well is a "slow learner," has "identifiable perceptual and communicative disorders" (IPCD), or has "significantly limited intellectual capacity" (SLIC)?

Well, the "slow learners" are "students

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of limited academic potential assigned to the regular classroom but who consistently require adjusted materials and tasks below grade placement." The IPCD kid is one "with identifiable perceptual and communicative disorders who is presently in an IPCD Program, has been certified for IPCD class but parentally exempted, or who has been returned to the regular classroom from an IPCD Program and must now try to function with reduced teacher availability." SLIC students are those "with significantly limited intellectual capacity who are presently in a SLIC Program, have been certified for SLIC class but parentally exempted, or who have been returned to the regular classroom from a SLIC Program and must now try to function with reduced teacher availability." If teachers get really distraught trying to tell the "emotionally disturbed" from the "hyperactive," the "transient" from those with "chronic absenteeism," they can always resort to the grab-bag "other" label: "students who do not fit any of the above categories." "Others" can be weighted anything from 1.5 to 2.5.

It's going to be very popular," said Barry Abel of NEA. "There have been hundreds of requests for information from other systems."

The plan came about when the Denver teachers found themselves with an embarrassment of riches at the bargaining table in 1976. "We'd elected a few school board members," said Clark Ballinger, head of the DCTA, "and we had negotiated one of the top five salary schedules in the country." What the teacher membership wanted next was smaller class loads, but cutting class size across the board was financially prohibitive and unpopular in the community. So the DCTA came up with and bargained for the class load relief plan.

The idea seems a plausible one at first look. Not all children are the same, or require the same amount of a teacher's energy, time, or imagination. Seeing classrooms not simply as body counts but as dynamic combinations of personalities is a step toward enlightenment. But the Denver teachers give away the real intent of the program by the manner in which it is set up. The formula is such that only the "normal" child isn't a problem. Those who read too fast or too slow, who are too active or too withdrawn, who vary from some textbook norm of acceptability in any way become problems. The plan allows teachers to take another step down that route where anything quirky, different, challenging, or unusual in a child becomes deviant and too much to handle without special help. It almost *requires* teachers to see kids as abstractions.

The plan allows teachers to take another step down that route where anything quirky, different, challenging, or unusual in a child becomes deviant and too much to handle without special help. It almost requires teachers to see kids as abstractions.

When all the students have been assigned a label and number, the teacher adds up the numbers to determine her weighted classroom load. A classroom with 25 children might suddenly be 35 or 40. She can then apply for "class size relief"—aides, a part-time teacher, a resource specialist—to a school building committee. The committee then ranks the requests as to priority and sends them along to a central district committee that doles out the relief funds, some $740,000 a year set aside by the contract.

THE DENVER TEACHERS' union calls the plan, which was patterned after a similar one operating in Lodi, California, "the final solution to the class size problem." But perhaps more important is the response of the National Education Association, of which the Denver Classroom Teachers Association is an affiliate. The plan may "revolutionize teacher contracts," said an NEA spokesman. In order to spread the good news to other districts, NEA has prepared a brochure telling other affiliates how to negotiate such a plan. "It will be adopted in a lot of places.

If the teachers were really interested in breaking the single class load standard, they'd have to admit that they—as well as the kids—are all different, that some teachers have a much greater tolerance for noise or activity than others, that one teacher might have a greater ability to reach the needs of the very bright, the angry, the slow or the shy than another, that teachers—like kids—are not just interchangeable parts of classroom units.

But the DCTA says that all teachers are the same. Still, even if the teachers were willing to admit to individual differences among their ranks, they would doubtless find some way to match up kids and teachers that would preserve their own human dignity. They wouldn't demean themselves with labels that tell nothing about a person's resources or needs, would never assign themselves to categories of "normally achieving," "slow learning," "emotionally disturbed," or "hyperactive"—although teachers could as easily as kids be sorted out and weighted in that manner in a system with that kind of vision about teaching and learning. But no, the DCTA members have more personal dignity than to let themselves get labeled "emotionally disturbed" and assigned a corresponding number just because their classroom behavior fits that category on the list of descriptions. It's only the kids who get analyzed and weighted by the system as problems and burdens.

THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF the plan suggested that teachers could use the relief money in whatever way they wanted—for materials, for a resource specialist, for innovative curriculum projects. In fact, most of the money spent so far in the elementary grades has gone for classroom aides or part-time teachers. There's no doubt that another body in the classroom does lighten the teacher's load. The theory, of course, is that the routine work gets done by the aide so that the teacher has more time to teach. But a federally funded study by the Institute of Industrial and Labor Relations at the University of Oregon on teacher and paraprofessional work productivity confirmed what some observers had long suspected: that when an aide comes on the scene, most often the aide does a lot of teaching while the teacher becomes even more of a classroom manager. In that study, when classrooms gained full-time aides, the average teacher's daily instructional input increased only from 92 minutes to 109 minutes in the five-hour teaching day. At the same time, however, the aides were teaching 129 minutes a day or about 18 percent more than their professional counterparts. In addition, the aides got tied down in fewer routine tasks than did the teachers.

The question is, Do the Denver teachers —and their counterparts in other school systems—want aides so that teachers may really spend more time involved in the messy and intense business of teaching, or do they simply want a buffer between themselves and the kids, whom they check off as "disordered," "disabled," "disruptive," "uncooperative," "incapable," and "inadequate" under their new plan? In school districts where teachers have won fat salary contracts, the next requests have usually been for some limiting of the time teachers spend with kids, by the removal of the teacher from recess and lunchroom duty, from any contact with kids outside the four classroom walls. The next step seems to be to limit the teacher's contact with children even in the classroom, in the belief that it is more "professional" to be a petty administrator than what a teacher should be, a helpmate of the young.

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A NEW LOOK AT THE SOURCES OF SOVIET CONDUCT

WHY DETENTE CAN WORK

By STEPHEN F. COHEN

SOVIET RUSSIA HAS BEEN ON our minds—a virtual obsession—for exactly 60 years. During these 60 years, far more has changed in the Soviet Union than in our perceptions and ideas. Even now, as a new American debate on Soviet policy unfolds, it is clear that much of our thinking still bears deep traces of that narrow consensus once admired as "bipartisanship," and that in many quarters Cold War attitudes and misconceptions are as firmly lodged as ever. This should alarm us, not only because of the sterile foreign policies this kind of thinking once produced, but because of the way these Cold War attitudes also distorted our own domestic values and priorities.

Any rethinking about Soviet intentions and behavior abroad must begin with an understanding of Soviet domestic politics and society. Indeed, American thinking about Soviet foreign policy over the years has almost always emphasized this connection; and, by the same token, most of our misconceptions of Soviet intentions abroad have derived from misconceptions of the character and direction of Soviet domestic factors. In particular, the tenacious view of a continuously revolutionary and militantly expansionist Soviet Union, a view that dominated American thinking for so long and has now, after a short decline, reappeared in opposition to détente, is based on a static, a historical image of a fundamentally unchanged and unchanging Soviet system. Just as observed alterations in Soviet foreign policy are dismissed, in this view, as merely tactical maneuvers in a relentless drive for world conquest, so too are internal changes said to be secondary to the basic continuities that determine the real nature of the Soviet Union and its intentions abroad.

No informed person will deny that the Soviet Union continues to have a highly authoritarian and often repressive political system, which regularly deprives its citizens of elementary political liberties. Nor will a careful student any longer argue either of two once-popular extremes—that there is an immutable irreconcilability between

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TO UNDERSTAND THAT SOVIET HISTORY HAS SEEN FAR-REACHING CHANGES IS TO REJECT THE POPULAR VIEW OF AN IMMUTABLE SYSTEM.

the Soviet Union and the United States; or, on the other hand, that modern history is somehow moving toward a "convergence" between the two systems. But even if we reject these extreme perspectives, there remains a great potential for disagreement among knowledgeable people.

For the plain truth is that we so-called Soviet specialists know and understand our subject very imperfectly. We have learned a great deal about Soviet life in recent years, but this knowledge has demonstrated mainly that our conceptions or models of the Soviet Union are not adequate —that they are all far too simplistic. The main thing we have learned is that behind the crumbling façade of political and social conformity, there is a tremendous complexity of reality at every level of Soviet life. Students of the centralized Soviet economy, for example, have begun to speak more of a "multicolored" economy of official and unofficial components, state and private enterprises, controlled and free transactions, of red, white, gray, and black markets. We need the same kind of "multicolored" approach to Soviet reality in general, which conforms as little to our models as it does to official Soviet ones, whether we are discussing the high politics of the Communist Party or the everyday life of the ordinary citizen.

What follows is an analysis, necessarily brief, of some of the ways in which the complexity of Soviet politics and society bear on Soviet-American relations.

TO UNDERSTAND THAT SOviet history has witnessed periodic and far-reaching internal changes is to reject the popular view of an immutable Soviet system. The fact that the main institutions of the political system—the Communist Party, the official Marxist-Leninist ideology, the planned state economy, the political police, and so forth—have continued to exist over the years says little. It is a commonplace of political history that deep changes in the working and nature of a political system often occur within a continuous institutional framework, and in this process the institutions themselves are inwardly changed. The American presidency and the English parliament continue to exist; but they are not the same institutions they were in the nineteenth century, nor do the American and English political systems function just as they did a hundred years ago. Even the names that historians customarily give to the main periods in Soviet political history bespeak the deep changes that have occurred since 1917: War Communism, the New Economic Policy, Stalinization, de-Stalinization.

The most recent of these great changes in the Soviet Union must be kept in mind when we talk about the present and the future. Our focus on the continuing authoritarianism and political abuses in the Soviet Union obscures the fact that during the Khrushchev years, there occurred in that country an authentic political and social reformation. Virtually every area of Soviet life was affected by the changes, however contradictory and ultimately limited, of 1953–1964, from the end of mass terror and freeing of millions of prison camp victims, the measures introduced to limit at least some of the worst bureaucratic abuses and privileges, the civic awakening and growing political participation of educated society, and the array of economic and welfare reforms, to revisions in Soviet foreign policy that led to what we now call détente.

For our own thinking, the significance of this reformation (sometimes called de-Stalinization), which changed the Soviet Union for the better in many fundamental ways, is threefold. First, it reminds us that current Soviet abuses of power and violations of civil rights, however deplorable, are far more limited and less severe than in the Stalinist past. Second, it is evidence that a short time ago there existed, inside the Soviet political establishment, significant forces for reform. There is no reason to assume that such forces do not still exist. And third, it helps us to understand the conservative reaction that followed the overthrow of Khrushchev in 1964 and continues today. In another society, this reaction would be considered normal. In American and English politics, for example, it is thought to be virtually axiomatic that periods of reform are followed by conservative backlashes.

Some of the major problems faced by the Soviet leadership today are common to industrial societies, but many are the direct legacy of Soviet historical development, the limitations of the reforms of 1953–1964, and the conservative reaction after 1964. Western specialists disagree as to which problems are the most serious. Suffice it to itemize a few that the Soviets themselves emphasize.

At home, there is a chronic decline in industrial and technological development and persistently low labor productivity; a collective agricultural system that still cannot reliably feed the population; widespread consumer grumbling and housing shortages; a politically restive intellectual class; disenchantment with official values among young people; growing birthrates and nationalist sentiments among the major non-Slav groups, and a declining birthrate among Russians; a small but defiant dissident movement along with a large readership of uncensored (*samizdat*) literature; and, in the realm of political authority, the still unresolved, and pertinent, question of the terrible crimes of the Stalin era. More generally, there is the overarching administrative problem of a centralized bureaucratic system created in the very different conditions of the 1930s, which still prevails in all areas of Soviet life—political, economic, social, cultural, scientific—and which generates and institutionalizes a multitude of inefficiences, Catch 22s, and popular resentments. These public problems have their reflection in private difficulties: rampant drunkenness, family disintegration, and (from the party's viewpoint) the revival of religious belief.

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Abroad, the Soviet leadership, for all its gains as a great power since 1945, can find little solace. There is the perceived menace of China; the recalcitrant empire in Eastern Europe, which has been the scene of a major crisis every decade; the advent in Western Europe of so-called Eurocommunist parties, whose success threatens to complete the de-Russification of international Communism; the familiar problem of Third World "allies," who become fickle or difficult to control; and the staggering costs of a global competition, however peaceful, with the United States.

The main thing to be said about these problems is not that they portend an imminent crisis, but that they represent long-term and hopelessly intertwined dilemmas, and impose severe constraints on domestic and foreign policy. And there is no real majority view as to their solution, largely because of the deep divisions on every major issue and problem, even among Soviet officials and party members.

THE COMPLEX REALITY IS NOW CLEAR: THE DIVERSITY OF SOVIET OPINION IS PROBABLY EQUAL TO THAT OF ANY "OPEN" SOCIETY.

THIS ABSENCE OF AN OFFICIAL Soviet consensus is still hard for many Westerners to comprehend. For many years, misled by the silence and conformity imposed by Stalin's terror, we imagined something that did not exist —a homogeneous Soviet officialdom and even society. The complex reality is now clear: The diversity of Soviet opinion is probably equal to that in any "open" society (though more private, of course), ranging from orthodox Marxism-Leninism to Russian Orthodox religion, from democratic to authoritarian, liberal to neofascist, from left to right. More importantly, variations of this diversity exist within the political establishment and even inside the ruling Communist Party.

This will surprise those who take seriously official claims of a "monolithic" party, who continue to speak meaninglessly of "the Soviets," "the Communist mind," and "ideological blueprints," and who imagine an unbridgeable gulf between the party-state and society at large. It makes no sense to think of the Communist Party, with its more than 15 million members, or the Soviet state, which employs virtually the entire population, as somehow remote or apart from society. At the very least, we must understand that while the party-state seeks to direct and control society, it is permeated by the diverse, conflicting attitudes of that society.

It is in this context that we can gain a better perspective on the dissident movement, which has come to figure so promimently in American thinking and, alas, is in danger of becoming the hostage of our foreign policy. Western specialists have trouble reconciling two seemingly contradictory truths. On the one hand, we know that the emergence and persistence of open dissent is an important development in Soviet history. On the other hand, we know that the active dissidents are very small in numbers and political impact.

How can we reconcile these truths? By realizing, I think, that most of the different trends of thought expressed openly by dissidents are to be found, in at least some subterranean form, within Soviet officialdom. This does not mean that dissident activists are spokesmen for real or potential oppositionists inside the Establishment, but simply that dissident views reflect in significant measure, however obliquely, the array, and disarray, of attitudes among officials as well. It may be too much to expect that one day, as happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968, there will develop an active alliance between reformers inside and outside the party, though perhaps this possibility should not be excluded. But we should remember that it does happen in politics, though admittedly less often in Russian history, that the heresy of today's outcast becomes the wisdom of tomorrow's successful reformer.

MOST IMPORTANT for our thinking about future Soviet and American policy are the competing political trends inside the Communist Party, and particularly at its middle and upper levels. Our knowledge here is imprecise, and this advises caution and warns against speculation. But it is safe to say that in the past 25 years three main trends have been formed and struggled over; these may loosely be termed reformist, conservative, and reactionary or neo-Stalinist.

Party reformers, now the weakest in number and influence, include some advocates of authentic democratization, but many more administrators, managers, or technocrats who only want more room for initiative, and hence some liberalization, in their own areas of responsibility. Many reformers seem to think in terms of the more decentralized Communist systems of Yugoslavia or Hungary, but for all of them the armed Soviet interruption of the Czech reforms in 1968 was a great blow. The conservatives, who have predominated almost everywhere in Soviet politics since the mid-1960s, also include various types, from sincere believers in the virtues of the status quo to cynical defenders of vested bureaucratic interest. Some lean toward the moderate reformers, some toward the neo-Stalinists. The party's neo-Stalinist wing can only be viewed as reactionary. Its solutions to contemporary problems are couched in an extreme Russian chauvinism and nostalgia for the more despotic ways of the Stalin days, though they would certainly stop short of mass terror.

Future change in the Soviet Union will depend in large measure on the struggle between these trends in the party. Change can be for the better or the worse, of course, toward liberalization or back toward a harsher authoritarianism. Since its inception in 1964, and especially since 1966–1968, the conservative, or centrist, Brezhnev government has turned increasingly toward the party's neo-Stalinist wing, particularly in domestic affairs. The bleak prospect of still greater neo-Stalinist influence, or even a leadership dominated by these party elements, cannot be excluded. Arguably, in present conditions, an intensification of neo-Stalinism is more likely than a resurgence of reformism.

I personally, however, have not yet succumbed to the chronic pessimism that seems eventually to come over Western specialists on the Soviet Union. I do not rule out the possibility of another wave of reform, during or in the aftermath of a leadership succession. Support for at least a limited liberalization—if not a Moscow spring, another thaw—exists at many levels of Soviet society, from the collective farm chairman or factory manager who wants more leeway to maximize efficiency, the scientist who needs

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A SOVIET REFORMISM COUCHED IN WESTERN TERMS OR ENCUMBERED BY FOREIGN SPONSORS WOULD BE TAINTED AND DOOMED.

greater access to information for the breakthrough he sees ahead, the increasingly educated citizen who hungers for the more interesting achievements of both Soviet and non-Soviet culture, to the working-class person whose consumer desires have alternately been fanned and disappointed by the government.

Any genuine reform requires, however, two conditions, both of concern to us. First, it must be reform with a Soviet face. Those among us who argue that Soviet reform must be patterned on Western examples or imposed from abroad understand little about Russia or the process of reform in general. No reform movement anywhere, but especially in a country as historically self-conscious as the Soviet Union, can be successful if it is estranged from its own history and culture. It must find inspirations, roots, and ultimately legitimacy within its native—in this case, Russian *and* Soviet—political and historical traditions. A Soviet reformism couched in Western terms, or encumbered by foreign sponsors, would be tainted and doomed. For this reason alone, the best hope is those Soviet innovators who reason in terms of the existing system, whether they call themselves liberal socialists, communist reformers, democratic Marxist-Leninists, or simply doers of small deeds, and not those who repudiate the whole Soviet experience since 1917.

Second, much will depend upon the international environment, and thus upon American policy and behavior. Soviet reform has a chance only in conditions of a progressive relaxation of tensions between the USSR and its foreign adversaries. Worsening international relations will drive the Soviet Union back into her isolation and past, strengthening the reactionaries and further diminishing the reformers of all stripes. Or to take a different example, a complete break between the Soviet Communist Party and the Eurocommunist parties of Italy, France, and Spain would be an unfortunate development. These European parties have been a source of some restraint and liberal influence on the Soviet leadership, and a break would only further reduce this kind of Western influence and strengthen hard-line tendencies in the USSR.

DESPITE THE DIVERSITY OF Soviet opinion, and the guarded optimism for the future which it justifies, we ought not to lose sight of an important fact: The predominant outlook, again both among officials and ordinary citizens, is a profound conservatism. By "Soviet conservatism" I mean the everyday gut sentiments that characterize social and political conservatism elsewhere, including our own country. It is a deep sentimentality about one's own past, about the commonplace and familiar, an instinctive preference for existing routines and orthodoxies (however obsolete), and a fear of things new as somehow threatening and potentially chaotic. Politically, it is not always a flat rejection of any change; but it is an almost prohibitive insistence that change be very slow, tightly controlled, based on "law and order" (which is also a Soviet catch-phrase) for fear "things will be worse," and hence it is an instinctive, though often conditional, deference to political authorities that guard the present against the future, including the armed forces and the police.

That a system born in revolution and still professing revolutionary ideas should have become one of the most conservative in the world may seem preposterous. But all those factors variously said to be most important in Soviet politics have contributed to this conservatism: the bureaucratic tradition of Russian government before the revolution; the subsequent bureaucratization of Soviet life, which proliferated conservative norms and created an entrenched class of zealous defenders of bureaucratic privilege; the geriatric nature of the present-day elite; and even the official ideology, whose thrust turned many years ago from the creation of a new social order to extolling the existing one.

Underlying all these factors is the Soviet historical experience, which is still for a great many citizens the story of their own lives. If few peoples have achieved so much so quickly, none has suffered such a traumatic history. In 60 years, man-made catastrophes have repeatedly victimized millions of Soviet citizens—the first European war, revolution, civil war, two great famines, forcible collectivization, Stalin's great terror, World War II. Every family has lost someone dear, often more than once. These memories live with an intensity that is hard for us to imagine. Out of this experience in living memory have developed the underlying joint pillars of Soviet conservatism—a sense of great national pride and earned prestige from the achievements, together with an anxiety that the next disaster forever looms and must be guarded against. It is said that the conservatism of our own fathers grew out of their pride of having overcome hard times. We should, then, be capable of some empathy for these Soviet conservatives, political officials and plain citizens alike, whose accomplishments were no less and whose times were harder.

Having barely recognized this conservatism, we have yet to calculate fully its influence in either Soviet domestic or foreign politics. At home, it is an important bond between the government and the majority of the people. It affects all areas of policy-making, all segments of the population, high and low, and even the political dissidents, who fear internal turmoil as much as they object to the government.

Its influence on foreign policy cannot, I think, be easily exaggerated. Above all, this conservatism informs Soviet leaders' acute sense of national prestige, a crucial element in their outlook obscured by our rival notions that they are either aggressive ideologues or cynical realists. When offended, this prestige factor can cause them to postpone, or even jettison, international relations that they otherwise desire, be it trade or arms limitation agreements. On the other hand, when they perceive a ratification of Soviet prestige and status, it can lead them to join in international agreements that include provisions not to their liking, such as the Helsinki accords of 1975.

To put this differently, we usually discuss Soviet policy in terms of "strategic parity." This is important, of course. But the larger Soviet striving in recent times has been for political parity, for respect equal to that of the other superpower—full recognition of its achievements and rightful place in the world. As with the United States, this striving means both conserving and, where possible, enhancing the Soviet Union's status in a changing world. And nothing is more insulting than persistent suggestions in the West that the achievements and power status of the Soviet Union are somehow illegitimate.

Righteous indignation about foreign "interference in our internal affairs" is often a hypocritical dodge. But when a Soviet official complains, to take a recent example, that "James Carter has assumed the role of mentor to the USSR," we hear the voice of hurt pride and genuine resentment. The "surprising adverse reaction in the Soviet Union to our stand on human rights," which President Carter now acknowledges, should have surprised no one. It proved to be "a greater obstacle to other friendly pursuits, common goals,

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like in SALT, than I [President Carter] had anticipated" because, contrary to American spokesmen, for Soviet leaders a "linkage" between those issues did exist. Perceiving a direct affront to their self-esteem, they reacted—as they did when confronted by the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments in 1974—accordingly, and predictably.

A last example of how this conservatism can influence Soviet behavior must suffice. American critics of détente and SALT see aggressive military intentions in the circumstances that, as Paul Nitze put it, "Americans think in terms of deterring war almost exclusively. The Soviet leaders think much more of what might happen in such a war." Given the Soviet unpreparedness and loss of perhaps 20 million people in the last war, we should be surprised if it were otherwise. Indeed, a Soviet government that did not make some efforts in this direction, for example the civilian defense programs in which our antidétente lobby sees such ominous implications, would hardly be a Soviet government at all.

TO PROMISE DÉTENTE WITHOUT CONFLICT, OR TO REJECT DÉTENTE BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT, IS SILLY ILLOGIC.

WHAT DOES ALL this tell us more concretely about Soviet foreign policy and what does this prescribe for American policy? For me there is no sane or moral or otherwise desirable alternative in the nuclear age to what is now called, somewhat loosely, détente. To the intransigent cold-warriors on both sides, who insist that détente is a "one-way street," we must say, with Pyrrhus, a few more such victories and we are all undone.

Reducing the risks of nuclear war is, thus, the first and irreproachable reason for détente. There is, however, even among its American (and Soviet) advocates, a spectrum of thinking about the desirable nature and scope of détente. Some advocate a narrow policy centered almost exclusively on military issues. While this position is preferable to the flatly antidétente one, it is one-dimensional and unrealistic. Cooperation in the area of military safeguards is inseparable from broader forms of stable relations between the two countries. I favor a policy of détente that can go beyond relaxation of tensions to full relations on all levels, but one consistent with intractable realities and free of extravagant expectations. For this we need an understanding of détente considerably broader than today's events.

The contemporary history of what we now call détente did not begin in 1972, but in the Eisenhower-Khrushchev era. In short, détente is already a historical process with previous stages of development that include both progress and setbacks. At different stages, quite different issues have been in the forefront—pullbacks from military confrontation, cultural exchanges, summitry, Berlin, Cuba, the Middle East, arms talks, trade, Jewish emigration, human rights.

It is therefore essential that détente as a process not be understood as something ultimately determined by one or more current events. This kind of political gimmickry, practiced sometimes by the opponents of détente as well as Nixon-Kissinger proponents of détente, can only produce unrealistic expectations and needless disillusionment, as we are now witnessing. A durable détente policy must be historical and longsighted. It must be formulated in the certainty of future stages, of future setbacks as well as achievements.

Even in the best circumstances, there will be tough bargaining, sharp disagreements, and open conflicts of national interest between the United States and the USSR. The goal is to reduce these elements progressively at each stage. We are, after all, talking about "détente" between longstanding rivals with very different social systems, political traditions, and orthodoxies, and not about Anglo-American relations. To imagine that these differences will disappear, or even diminish notably, in an appointed time because of proclamations is dangerous nonsense. To promise détente without conflict, or to reject détente because of the conflict, is silly illogic. It is like saying that the job of diplomacy is only to formalize what already unites nations, and not to reconcile what divides them.

Two primary conditions for a progressively broadening détente are already present. First, there are substantial domestic forces for détente in both countries, despite parallel controversies about its dangers. Alarmist warnings about secret Soviet "intentions" and strategic "blueprints" fly in the face of the disarray in Soviet policy-thinking and similar mundane realities. (As George F. Kennan has remarked, in reference to the age of the Soviet leaders, old men do not usually have long-term intentions.) Escalating military expenditures, the danger of mutual destruction, economic problems, and other domestic factors have brought a sizable part even of the conservative Soviet establishment away from old autarkic habits to acceptance of fuller relations with the West.

In other words, the main thrust of Soviet conservatism today is to preserve what it already has at home and abroad, not to jeopardize it. A conservative government is, of course, capable of dangerous militaristic actions, as we saw in Czechoslovakia and on a far larger scale in Vietnam; but these are acts of imperial protectionism, a kind of defensive militarism, not a revolutionary or aggrandizing one. It is certainly true that for most Soviet leaders, as presumably for most American leaders, détente is not an altruistic endeavor but the pursuit of national interests. In one sense, this is sad. But it is probably also true that mutual self-interest provides a more durable basis for détente than lofty, and finally empty, altruism.

The second existing condition is a shared philosophy of détente. Both sides now officially define détente as including both cooperation and competition, in peaceful conditions, between the two countries. If cooperation through SALT eliminates or significantly reduces military competition, we have no reason to fear the other kinds of competition, assuming we have confidence in our own system. If American business firms cannot be allowed to trade freely with Soviet agencies, it speaks poorly for the capitalism the United States claims to profess. If the Soviet leadership's refusal to give up what it calls "ideological struggle," which so alarms our critics of détente, deters us, this speaks poorly for our own ideology, which emphasizes the virtue of conflicting ideas.

Without exaggerating or blinking away the conflicts, the U.S. government should pursue the cooperative component of détente vigorously and imaginatively. Beyond this, détente is too important to be left to governments alone. A variety of nongovernmental American organizations and citizens have been pursuing these kinds of relations, sometimes in the face of official American indifference and even obstructionism, for many years. They should be encouraged. American policy alone cannot, of course, guarantee the future of détente. This requires no less a prodétente Soviet leadership with sufficient support in its own high establishment to withstand the inevitable setbacks in Soviet-American relations. And this takes us back to the Soviet domestic scene.

Supporters of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and other restrictions on détente have, so to speak, a half-idea. They argue, correctly, that the future of détente must be related to change inside

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THE REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER AMERICAN POLICIES ACTUALLY PROMOTE POLITICAL LIBERTIES IN THE SOVIET UNION.

the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, they seem not to understand that domestic change can also be for the worse, and that liberalizing change depends upon the respective political fortunes of trends and groups inside the Soviet establishment. These proponents of a kind of remote-control American interventionism in Soviet politics violate what should be our first axiom: We do not have the wisdom or the power, or the right, to try directly to shape change inside the Soviet Union. (An unfortunate example of this lack of wisdom and potential for mischief was Senator Jackson's attack on the well-known dissident Roy Medvedev as "nothing but a front man, a sycophant for the leadership." Jackson went on to liken Medvedev to "certain Jews [who] fronted for Goering, Goebbels and Hitler" [*New York Times*, January 28, 1975]. Expelled from the party, subjected to periodic searches, and out of work, Medvedev is a democratic Marxist who tries to speak to and for reformers inside the party.) Any foreign government that becomes deeply involved in Soviet internal politics, or for that matter in Soviet émigré politics (whose many different "ambassadors" will continue to appeal to us), will do itself and others more harm than good.

What the United States can and should do is influence Soviet liberalization *indirectly* by developing a long-term American foreign policy, and thereby an international environment, that will strengthen reformist trends and undermine reactionary ones inside the Soviet Union. This means relaxing tensions further and drawing the Soviet Union into full, stable, relations with the Western countries—in short, détente. It is not, in the lingering rhetoric of another generation, "appeasement." Such a policy allows for hard bargaining for our own national interests and private demands for certain kinds of Soviet behavior. But it is predicated on an American conduct that takes into account the nature of Soviet conservatism and is not calculated to offend needlessly the self-image and prestige of the Soviet establishment. Our new interventionists fail on all counts. Bombastic ultimatums, discriminatory congressional restrictions, and condescending preachments addressed publicly to the Soviet leadership offend the conservative majority, vivify the xenophobic prophecies of the reactionaries, and make meaningful reform suspect, if not impossible, as a concession to outside pressure.

THIS BRINGS US, FINALLY, TO the issue of political rights (a more exact term than "human rights" in this instance) in the Soviet Union, an issue which has become the central focus in our current debate over détente. The question is terribly complex, even agonizing, especially for people with firsthand knowledge of the Soviet Union. And like other issues that are translated superficially into a Manichean choice between morality and immorality, it creates acrimonious divisions and false illusions.

Our own disagreements about American policy toward Soviet political rights should be among Americans equally committed to political liberties as a universal principle. The real question is not the validity of this principle, but whether specific American policies actually promote political liberties and safeguard dissent in the Soviet Union. There are, for example, knowledgeable Westerners who have had extensive contact with Soviet dissidents over the years, who admire them as courageous individuals and as representatives of a noble cause, but who have deep misgivings about recent American measures in this area. Furthermore, it is fully consistent to want a larger moral aspect in American foreign policy, especially after our immoral and even criminal commissions in Vietnam and Chile, and still disapprove of certain American measures directed against Soviet violations of political rights. This does not reflect a bias in favor of left-wing dictatorships, but concern for the actual consequences of a specific policy.

American proponents of a hard-line policy exhort us to rally behind "our friends, the Soviet dissidents." But the Soviet dissident community is itself deeply divided on the question of American policy. A great many dissidents do insist that a tough American line on behalf of Soviet political rights has been, and will continue to be, only beneficial; and they want more of the same. But another group argues that tougher American policies, from Senator Jackson's to President Carter's, have had, and can only have, a negative impact, because by going beyond diplomatic pressure to open confrontation, they galvanize Soviet conservative and reactionary opposition to both active dissidents and reformers inside the Soviet system.

General references to "the Soviet dissidents" are therefore meaningless. Dissident opinion is far too diverse. Indeed, there are even Orthodox nationalist dissidents who dislike both détente and American interference in Soviet affairs. But even the numerical fact that most dissident activists want a hard-line American policy does not prove its wisdom. It reflects instead the circumstance that since 1972, many Soviet protesters have increasingly lost hope in internal sources of change and thus, for reasons of politics and morale, have looked increasingly to pressure from outside, specifically from the United States. We can understand this psychological development; but good sense tells us that it is bad for us and for them.

The proof is, as we say, in the pudding. President Carter's human rights campaign of early 1977 (insofar as it was directed at the Soviet Union), like earlier measures linking trade and détente to levels of Jewish emigration, has done more harm than good. It may be inexact to call President Carter's campaign a policy, since, as we now have been told by an administration spokesman, it "was never really set down, thought out and planned" (Andrew Young, *Washington Post*, June 6, 1977). It may even be that the campaign originated as much with domestic American political concerns.

Whatever the case, the "adverse reaction in the Soviet Union" was unanticipated. Although it is possible that a new Soviet crackdown on dissidents was planned even before President Carter took office, the nature and dimensions of the crackdown in 1977 were made worse by American statements and actions. Each dramatic act of the Carter administration's campaign—sharp warnings on behalf of Soviet dissidents in late January, the president's personal letter to Andrei Sakharov in early February, his White House meeting with exiled dissident Valdimir Bukovsky in early March—was followed by new acts of Soviet repression at home, from the arrests of Aleksandr Ginzburg and Yuri Orlov in February to the interrogation of American correspondent Robert Toth in June. We must see clearly what ensued—a dangerous game of political chicken, reminiscent of the Cold War, played at the highest levels. ("We're not going to back down," declared President Carter [*New York Times*, January 31, 1977].) The victims were both our "common goals" and Soviet dissidents themselves.

Why did the Carter administration's campaign become counterproductive? I do not think that the reason is to be found in the president's general statements on human rights and Helsinki. In signing these accords, the Soviet leadership must have reconciled itself to something along these lines, particularly from a new American administration, as part of the "ideological struggle." The reason was rather the way in which the campaign directly assaulted, even if only inadvertently, all those aspects of Soviet

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conservatism I have mentioned. Two highly publicized episodes—the president's letter to Sakharov and the White House invitation to Bukovsky—are vivid examples.

The Carter campaign began in January 1977 and thus coincided with the sixtieth anniversary year of the Russian Revolution, a time when Soviet conservatism and official self-esteem are in continuous celebration and at their most acute. The administration's first statements and President Carter's letter then came on the heels of an extraordinary event and one of Sakharov's rare mistakes—his public suggestion that Soviet authorities themselves were responsible for the fatal bombing in a Moscow subway in early January. Scarcely any dissidents took this suggestion seriously, and Sakharov himself later seemed to regret it. More important, the bombing was an unprecedented event that greatly alarmed and embarrassed Soviet authorities. The decision to issue a presidential statement on Soviet civil rights in the form of a letter to Sakharov on this unusual occasion was very bad judgment. Nothing could have been more offensive to official Soviet sensibilities. (It may also have confirmed doubts among some Soviet officials about the authenticity of American concern for Soviet political rights.)

The Bukovsky affair raises similar questions of judgment. In December 1976, the Soviet government exchanged Bukovsky, a defiant and brave dissident then in his eleventh year of prison camps and mental hospitals, for the jailed Chilean Communist leader Luis Corvalán. This, too, was an extraordinary development. The Soviet Union not only dealt equally with what it calls a "fascist dictatorship," it also acknowledged for the first time its own political prisoners. International publicity had made Bukovsky's personal fate an embarrassment. But it seems likely that the Soviet decision to risk its prestige in this dramatic way also had the larger purpose of exploring the feasibility, and political costs, of future agreements for the release of other Soviet prisoners.

Any such possibility was aborted, at least for the time, by President Carter's invitation to Bukovsky. Their meeting, which had the earmarks of a public relations coup against former President Ford's rebuff to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, allowed Bukovsky to denounce the Soviet government from the White House, implied that his release was a triumph of American policy, and thereby probably persuaded Soviet leaders that the political costs of such releases were too high. If our real concern is the plight of people, and not a propaganda victory, where is the morality in this outcome?

The same criticism applies to earlier American campaigns, culminating in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974, to make trade and détente dependent upon levels of Soviet Jewish emigration. The net effect was, as we know, to diminish that emigration considerably. But other questions were similarly ignored during the presidential primary season, when the issue of Jewish emigration came to the fore. Did the almost exclusive focus on Jews who wished to leave, with scant regard for other groups, reflect a moral commitment to the principle of open borders or the political power of Jewish lobbies in this country? How much thought was given to the frightful backlash that this campaign was certain to have on Soviet Jews who did not wish to emigrate? And how can monthly or annual quotas, and Soviet compliance, be determined when no one knows how many Jews actually want to leave?

The case against these kinds of shortsighted, highly publicized, and politcally volatile campaigns that link American policy to specific events, issues, or prominent dissidents inside the Soviet Union is, I think, overwhelming. They involve us in complexities and ramifications beyond our control and in moral ambiguities beyond our power to resolve. Inside the United States, they encourage a revival of Cold War attitudes which could again distort our own domestic priorities, while undermining public support for détente. Internationally, they generate tensions and confrontations between Moscow and Washington detrimental to our mutual interests and endanger private concessions already granted by Soviet and East European authorities, in the area of family reunification, for example. (Prime Minister Trudeau and Chancellor Schmidt have expressed concern that increased movement of people from Eastern Europe to Canada and West Germany may be jeopardized.) Inside the Soviet Union, they create an atmosphere detrimental to liberalization, by arousing the conservative majority against American "interference," tainting both dissidents and reformers as "Western agents," abetting the party's neo-Stalinist wing, and misguiding the dissident community.

Indeed, the most ominous of recent Soviet reactions is neither the new arrests, which arguably would have come anyway, nor the setbacks in SALT negotiations, which after a decent interlude have begun to move ahead, but the official Soviet campaign linking dissidents, and potentially any reformer, to the American government and specifically to the CIA. The emptiness of this charge is matched only by its grim revival of one of the worst themes of the Stalinist past. It seems to be, alas, a response to the Carter administration's own campaign, and is plain evidence that the neo-Stalinists have gained new influence in Soviet affairs.

THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED are not all negative. They teach us that whatever potential the American government has for influence on the Soviet leadership in the area of political rights must be exercised in private negotiations and not through public ultimatums, sermons, and other confrontations of national prestige. Since "quiet diplomacy" appears to have acquired a sinister connotation, let us call it simply "diplomacy." The Soviet leadership wants détente and the various agreements that it encompasses. In the proper place and manner, American representatives, from the president to State Department officials, can and should make clear that American public support for these relations depends significantly upon the status of political rights in the Soviet Union. Modest concessions and achievements are possible, certainly at first in the areas of emigration and family reunification. Despite its abominations in other areas, the Nixon-Kissinger administration did in fact achieve a great deal in this way. If our purpose is to help people, why scorn it?

At the same time, the American government should push for fuller relations at all levels with the Soviet Union. Not only because this will promote a general international environment more conducive to Soviet liberalization, but because these diverse contacts create additional opportunities for direct influence. The Soviet Union has demonstrated its desire for expanded, regularized transactions with, for example, American business and academic groups, which in turn gives these groups some influence on their Soviet counterparts and thus indirectly on Soviet policy-makers.

Moreover, it is at this profession-to-profession level that outcries against specific violations of political rights can be most effective. A good example is the campaign on behalf of Academician Sakharov waged successfully by the American Academy of Sciences in 1973. An organized protest by a professional association, directed to its Soviet counterpart, is more effective because it does not directly confront the Soviet government's prestige, it allows the Soviet leadership at least the fiction of referring the matter to a lesser Soviet body, and it thus draws a broader (and frequently more liberal) segment of Soviet officialdom into the deliberations. In brief, unlike official campaigns by the American president or Congress, it leaves room for concessions.

The final guideline simply reiterates the axiom I formulated earlier. Any policies that involve the American government deeply in the quite different world of Soviet domestic (or émigré) politics will end badly. It does not bespeak indifference, nor is it platitudinous, to emphasize that the Soviet future must be decided by people in the Soviet Union and in their own way. Clearly, even modest reform within the existing Soviet system would be good for them, for us, and for the world. This remains a possibility. But the main contribution the United States can make is more concern for our own problems at home, and a calm policy of restraint and détente abroad. ❧

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LETTERS ON LITERATURE AND POLITICS, 1912–1972, by Edmund Wilson, edited by Elena Wilson. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 768 pp., $20.00

The view from headquarters

HENRY NASH SMITH

AS THE TITLE INDICATES, THIS volume contains a selection made by Edmund Wilson's widow from the great bulk of his correspondence, which will eventually be edited by Leon Edel (who has written a foreword for this volume). Ms. Wilson has not only omitted, as she says, "love letters, family correspondence, and the like," but has kept editorial intrusions to a minimum in order to make "this book entirely Edmund's." The result is a fascinating body of material that will nevertheless prove frustrating for many readers with normal curiosity about the ornate, erotic career that gossip (with an assist from *Memoirs of Hecate County*) attributed to Wilson. And the policy of editorial restraint leaves unexplained quite a few matters of more legitimate interest, such as the identity of persons who are mentioned by first name only at a considerable interval after their original introduction.

But these are minor considerations in comparison with the solid value of the letters brought together here. They constitute a survey of American literature from the perspective of the headquarters staff during the half-century in which that literature came of age and achieved parity with the other major literatures of the world. As Daniel Aaron points out in his admirably judicious introduction, the correspondence also offers "a lively if unsystematic personal history of a gifted man and his literary generation."

Perhaps the most important of Wilson's literary friendships was that with Scott Fitzgerald, which began with their collaboration on an undergraduate musical comedy at Princeton in 1915 and lasted until Fitzgerald's death in 1940—and indeed beyond, for Wilson devoted much time and energy to editing the memorial to Fitzgerald published in 1945 as *The Crack-Up*. The list of correspondents includes Sherwood Anderson, John Peale Bishop (another Princeton friend), Louise Bogan, Van Wyck Brooks, Malcolm Cowley, and Waldo Frank—and continues almost indefinitely by way of H. L. Mencken, Edna Millay, Helen Muchnic, and Vladimir Nabokov to Elinor Wylie and Morton D. Zabel. Wilson was not gregarious in temperament, but his years on the editorial or reviewing staffs of the *New Republic*, the *Dial*, *Vanity Fair*, and the *New Yorker* brought him into contact with scores, even hundreds of men and women who, with or without talent, had literary ambitions. Furthermore, Wilson's own interest in books never flagged. As an adolescent in the Hill School, he wrote to his friends about Browning and Maeterlinck and Meredith; and in college he discussed Dostoevsky and Zola and Shaw and James and Wharton. From Joyce's *Portrait* in 1916 to Solzhenitsyn's autobiographical fiction and Akhmatova's poems (which he was reading in Russian during the last weeks of his life in 1972), he responded vividly—although not always favorably— to every major writer of Europe and America.

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*IN ADDITION TO LITERARY CRITI-*cism, Wilson wrote novels, poems, and plays; much straight reporting on current events; and, on a heroic scale, historical studies. His approach to literature was historical rather than formalistic. He was an inveterate opponent of the New Critics ("John Crowe Ransom and his commissars") who dominated the academic study and teaching of literature in this country from the 1930s to the 1960s. Yet although Wilson could be as vigorous (if not quite so rowdy) as H. L. Mencken in denouncing the professoriat, he had a scholar's passion for accuracy and was vain of his own unsystematic but formidable erudition. A long letter written in 1949 to Gilbert Highet, the Columbia classicist, about Highet's *The Classical Tradition* is characteristic. Wilson takes evident delight in informing Highet about Hrotswitha, "the German tenth-century nun who wrote Latin plays in imitation of Terence," and cites "an admirable paper on her by Zoltan Haraszti, unraveling the whole controversy, in the *Bulletin of the Boston Public Library* for March 1945." The letter goes on for several pages, quoting passages from the *Divine Comedy* that echo Virgil's language, and raising such questions as who first used the phrase "ivory tower" (was it Sainte-Beuve?); where Flaubert mentions Virgil; and how "the French alexandrine grew out of the iambic hexameter in which Greek tragedies are written."

Wilson's appetite for languages is well known. He not only kept up the Latin, Greek, and French he had been taught in school, and the Italian he had also acquired early, but during his visit to the Soviet Union in 1935, he set about learning Russian (and continued with the help, it is said, of a handsome émigrée neighbor on Cape Cod). Later, of course, came his study of Hebrew in order to investigate the Dead Sea scrolls, and still later an attack on Hungarian (incited by the production of several of his plays in Budapest).

In the academic terminology that Wilson scorned, however, his major field was European and American cultural and intellectual history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He first gained a national reputation in 1931 (at the age of 36) with *Axel's Castle*, a book that defined French symbolism for American readers and described its impact on Yeats, Eliot, Joyce, and Gertrude Stein. He established himself solidly as a major critic with *The Triple Thinkers* (1938), which included his Freudian interpretation of James's "The Turn of the Screw," and the essays on Dickens and on *Finnegans Wake* in *The Wound and the Bow* (1941). But the most impressive work of Wilson's middle years was *To the Finland Station* (1940), which traces the development of conceptions of history from Vico and Michelet through Marx and Engels to Lenin and Trotsky. He reported on demonstrations and labor troubles such as the miners' strike in West Virginia in 1931, but it is impossible to imagine the rather majestic Wilson marching arm in arm, literally or figuratively, with ungrammatical proletarian comrades. The one explicitly political letter in this collection is a rather vague manifesto ("composed . . . without the collaboration or knowledge of the Communists" by Wilson, Lewis Mumford, Waldo Frank, John Dos Passos, and Sherwood Anderson) that he invited Dreiser to sign. No results are recorded.

IN FACT, ALTHOUGH WILSON had been involved in the agitation against the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti in 1927, and had even been something of a fellow-traveler of the Communist Party in the early 1930s, he instinctively resisted organized movements and crusades. His basic commitment was to a kind of individualism, verging on anarchism, that became more and more explicit in his old age. It appears in the articles collected as *Apologies to the Iroquois* (1959); in *The Cold War and the Income Tax* (1963), generated by an altercation with the Internal Revenue Service; and in his denunciation of the Modern Language Association in 1969 for its attempt to define standard procedures to be followed in editing the works of major American writers.

The most celebrated expression of Wilson's antinomianism, however, was the introduction to his magnificent collection of essays about the literature of the American Civil War, *Patriotic Gore* (1962). This introduction caused something of a scandal because it maintained that American history (including the Northern resistance to the secession of the South) can best be explained by reference to animal appetites and aggression—a thesis recalling Dreiser's celebrated description of the dismemberment of a squid by a lobster in the opening pages of *The Financier*. Nevertheless, as Alfred Kazin has pointed out, the main test of *Patriotic Gore*, which was 12 years in the making, is permeated by his "love of the American past and his belief in American moral heroism. . . ."

Similarly, the dominant impression one takes away from this record of 60 years of thought about literature and history is of Wilson's lifelong devotion to a system of values, now under strenuous attack from exponents of the "structuralism" emanating from Paris, that might be called rational humanism. "In my view," he declared in 1940 in a lecture delivered at Princeton, "all our intellectual activity, in whatever field it takes place, is an attempt to give a meaning to our experience—that is, to make life more practicable; for by understanding things we make it easier to survive and get around among them." This is distinctly not exalted: Its sanction is "experience" and its proposed goal is not inspiration but understanding. Yet the attitude has a distinguished history, and it may well prove able to survive the current fashion for deprecating efforts to find in literature either the representation of any kind of reality or the expression of any kind of meaning. ❑

SAMUEL JOHNSON, by W. Jackson Bate. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 646 pp., $19.95.

SAMUEL JOHNSON: SELECTED POETRY AND PROSE, edited by Frank Brady and W. K. Wimsatt. University of California Press, 675 pp., $25.00.

Johnson redivivus

WILLIAM C. DOWLING

IN A BRIEF PREFACE TO TRAVES-ties, his brilliant play about James Joyce's Zurich years, Tom Stoppard gracefully mentions "Ellmann's superb biography, whose companionship was not the least pleasure in the writing of *Travesties.*" This I take as a sign that we have entered, perhaps without quite realizing it, a golden age of literary biography: When a biography like Richard Ellmann's *James Joyce* can exert so powerful a command over an imagination as complex as Mr. Stoppard's, we no longer have a situation in which scholars are writing biographies

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simply and exclusively for other scholars. Nor do we any longer have the situation, much more lamentable, in which popular literary biography is popular precisely because of its superficiality, its sacrifice of genuine scholarship to the false vim and brio of shallow journalistic treatment.

THE BIOGRAPHIES THAT HAVE carried us into the golden age—Ellmann's *Joyce*, Michael Holroyd's *Lytton Strachey*, W. J. Bate's *John Keats*—are endlessly fascinating, in short, just because they are works of deep and original scholarship, works in which an otherwise bewildering multiplicity of facts revolves in comprehensible order around a strong center of biographical truth. This is the company W. Jackson Bate's new *Samuel Johnson* immediately joins, as being both a supreme example of the biographer's art and the first great modern biography of that Johnson whose gigantic figure has always loomed so large in our cultural imagination. Yet this is more than a biography: It is an act of recovery, revealing to us a Johnson who has been lost for nearly 200 years.

To speak of Johnson as a lost figure is, of course, to tread on the margins of paradox. His work, in all its astonishing variety, is read everywhere, and his life—his habits, his eccentricities, his conversation—is known to us in its smallest details. Yet there is no paradox. We know all this because of Boswell, whose *Life of Johnson* remains the greatest biographical narrative ever written, and whose portrayal of Johnson as a moral hero is so compelling as to have become a sort of cultural myth. Like Achilles or Lear—like, at other moments, Mr. Micawber or Leopold Bloom—Boswell's Johnson belongs less to actual than to imaginative reality, and it is as an imagined figure that he exerts so enormous an appeal. We need look no further than the *Life of Johnson* to explain why no other great biography of Johnson has been written: For the modern biographer of Johnson, Boswell has always been the dragon at the gate.

YET WE HAVE BEGUN TO SEE IN recent years that the *Life of Johnson* must be read, if it is to be read at all, as a work of literature, and that doing so involves dissociating Boswell's Johnson from any real or historical Samuel Johnson in just the same way as, reading *Richard III*, we dissociate Shakespeare's Richard III from Richard III of England. At the same time, modern scholarship has long since begun to point, ever more insistently, to the existence of a Johnson much different from the great protagonist of Boswell's narrative. We know much, now, about Johnson's religion, his politics, even his illnesses, that was unknown to previous generations, and we have at last begun to take the measure of his enormous literary achievement. This is the Johnson whose story is so superbly told in Bate's biography.

The outlines of the story are so familiar as to seem part of our cultural memory: Johnson's birth as the half-dead, half-blind son of a poor provincial bookseller, his bitter departure from Oxford after only a year of formal study, his marriage to a capricious and bibulous widow 20 years older than himself, his years as a hack writer in the poverty-stricken obscurity of Grub Street, his sudden emergence as the sole author of the monumental *Dictionary of the English Language*, and, finally, the fame and relative prosperity of his later years. It is the later years that Boswell has immortalized, giving us a Johnson surrounded by the great talents and minds of the age (Burke, Goldsmith, Reynolds, Gibbon), dominating conversation—in a time when conversation was considered high art—with the sheer power of his wit and intelligence, writing the works on which his reputation would finally rest.

THE STORY IS RETOLD BY BATE, but with a depth of learning and research that puts everything into a new perspective. The Johnson of Bate's biography is a figure seldom glimpsed in Boswell, and in the course of the retelling a number of longstanding puzzles are solved: the nature of Johnson's emotional and intellectual attachment to Cornelius Ford and Gilbert Walmsley, the patron-figures of his youth; the reasons for his marriage to Elizabeth Porter, the blowsy widow who was so much his inferior in sense and sensibility; the truth about his "sado-masochistic" relationship with Mrs. Thrale (it did not exist, though a lurid version of events, complete with padlocks and chains and "a secret dearer than life," has been titillating the world of Johnson scholarship for years). As compared with other modern biographies of Johnson—with, for instance, the shallow geniality of John Wain's recent attempt at a popular biography—all this comes as a strong and bracing breeze through a stuffy room.

Yet the real center of Bate's work is Johnson as "one of the supreme moralists of modern times—as one of the handful of writers who, in what they say of human life and destiny, have become a part of the conscience of mankind." The fascination of Bate's story is the terrible vision of Johnson, haunted by despair and struggling against the sort of tragic self-deception that means the death of the spirit—the state of self-deception in which we all to one or another extent agree to pass our lives—winning from his inner conflict the moral clairvoyance that explains his greatness as a writer. This is biography as Johnson himself conceived it, what he had in mind when he said that all biography is useful, for we are, all of us, "prompted by the same motives, all deceived by the same fallacies, all animated by hope, obstructed by danger, entangled by desire, and seduced by pleasure."

A similar moral clairvoyance is the great virtue of Bate's biography, which may be said to do for Johnson what Johnson's own writings have done for generations of readers—to strip away the veil of appearances and penetrate to the moral reality beneath. The controlling image is of Johnson, as Bate once describes him, "as a moral searcher or pilgrim through the wilderness of life"; and in this deeply humane and immensely moving account of Johnson's pilgrimage, we continuously hear echoes of Johnson's own message to humanity. We are left with a picture of Johnson as a genius and a human being, a writer whose wisdom was born out of the torment of his mind, whose unending struggle against self-deception allowed him to teach us how to undeceive ourselves. This is the lost Johnson Bate has recovered for us.

Along with Bate's biography there comes, gratifyingly, a new anthology of Johnson's poetry and prose edited by Frank Brady and the late W. K. Wimsatt. Their *Samuel Johnson: Selected Poetry and Prose* immediately supersedes any edition previously available to the general reader. The textual accuracy of the anthology is, on a random comparison, equal to that of the best scholarly editions of Johnson's works, and its wealth of intelligent annotation provides a maximum of aid and comfort with a minimum of distraction from Johnson's own texts. A splendid edition, and one that might have been designed for the reader whose interest in Johnson's writings has been awakened by Bate's account of his life. ❏

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The Tolkien puzzle

DAVID FRIEDMAN

*THE SUCCESS OF J. R. R. TOL*kien is a puzzle, for it is difficult to imagine a less contemporary writer. He was a Catholic, a conservative, and a scholar in a field—philology—that many of his readers had never heard of. *The Lord of the Rings* fitted no familiar category; its success virtually created the field of "adult fantasy." Yet it sold millions of copies, and there are tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of readers who find Middle Earth a more important part of their internal landscape than any other creation of human art, and who know the pages of *The Lord of the Rings* the way some Christians know the Bible.

Humphrey Carpenter's recent *Tolkien: A Biography*, published by Houghton Mifflin,

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is a careful study of Tolkien's life, including such parts of his internal life as are accessible to the biographer. His admirers will find it well worth reading. We learn details, for instance, of Tolkien's intense, even sensual love for language; by the time he entered Oxford, he knew not only French, German, Latin, and Greek, but Anglo-Saxon, Gothic, and Old Norse. He began inventing languages for the sheer pleasure of it, and when he found that a language requires a history and a people to speak it, he began inventing them, too. The language was Quenya, the people were the elves. And we learn, too, some of the sources of his intense pessimism, of his feeling that the struggle against evil is desperate and almost hopeless, and all victories at best temporary.

Carpenter makes no attempt to explain his subject's popularity, but he provides a few clues, the most interesting of which is Tolkien's statement of regret that the English had no mythology of their own, and that at one time he had hoped to create one for them—a sort of English Kalevala. That attempt became *The Silmarillion,* which was finally published this fall, three years after the author's death; its enormous sales confirm Tolkien's continuing popularity. One of the offshoots of *The Silmarillion* was *The Lord of the Rings.*

What is the hunger that Tolkien satisfies? George Orwell described the loss of religious belief as the amputation of the soul, and suggested that the operation, while necessary, had turned out to be more than a simple surgical job. That comes close to the point, yet the hunger is not precisely for religion, although it is for something religion can provide. It is the hunger for a moral universe, a universe where, whether or not God exists, whether or not good triumphs over evil, good and evil are categories that make sense, that mean something. To the fundamental moral question "why should I do (or not do) something," two sorts of answers can be given. One answer is "the reason you feel you should do this thing is because your society has trained you (or your genes compel you) to feel that way." But that answers the wrong question. I do not want to know why I *feel* that I should do something; I want to know why (and whether) I *should* do it. Without an answer to that second question all action is meaningless. The intellectual synthesis in which most of us have been reared—liberalism, humanism, whatever one may call it—answers only the first question. It may perhaps give the right answer but it is the wrong question.

THE LORD OF THE RINGS IS A work of art, not a philosophical treatise; it offers, not a moral argument, but a world in which good and evil have a place, a world whose pattern affirms the existence of answers to that second question, answers that readers, like the inhabitants of that world, understand and accept. It satisfies the hunger for a moral pattern so successfully that the created world seems to many more real, more right, than the world about them.

Does this mean, as Tolkien's detractors have often said, that everything in his books is black and white? If so, then a great deal of literature, including all of Shakespeare, is black and white. Nobody in *Hamlet* doubts that poisoning your brother in order to steal his wife and throne is bad, not merely imprudent or antisocial. But the existence of black and white does not deny the existence of intermediate shades; gray can be created only if black and white exist to be mixed. Good and evil exist in Tolkien's work, but his characters are no more purely good or purely evil than are Shakespeare's.

One illustration of this, and one of the richnesses of *The Lord of the Rings,* is the variety of patterns of temptation and redemption woven through the book. The satanic enemy, Sauron, "was not always evil"; he is, apparently, like Lucifer, a fallen angel. Gollum, a twisted being with a taste for anything (or anyone) he can sneak up behind, gradually develops into a character for whom the reader feels sympathy and



even affection, and comes within a hairbreadth of being redeemed. Boromir yields to the temptation of the ring, tries to take it by force, fails, repents, and dies bravely, fighting to protect his weaker companions. His father, Denethor, yields not to the desire for power but to despair, killing himself in the belief that the city over which he is Steward has lost its long struggle with Sauron, at the very instant when in fact the tide has turned. To balance him there is his ally Theoden, who rises from age and despair to fight and die, with honor and glory, outside the walls of the same city. Many more examples could be given; for all Tolkien's characters, human or nonhuman, diabolic or semidivine, free will is a constant reality, and the potential for both good and evil always present.

Is *The Lord of the Rings* religious? Yes and no. There is a religious pattern but it is kept far in the background; there are no churches, no priests, no organized religion of any kind. So far as I can remember, the only direct reference to God is in the appendix. And while it is clear enough that certain characters are more than human, precisely what they are is left deliberately vague.

GOD, OR THE GODS, CANNOT intervene often and openly in human affairs without being reduced, as in Homer, to being merely humans with supernatural powers—or reducing the plot to a series of *dei ex machinis.* But there is a more fundamental reason why Tolkien does not clarify the "religious" background of his world. In "On Fairy Stories," an extraordinary essay written some years before *The Lord of the Rings* was published, Tolkien discussed the enchanted realm of Faery. If we understood entirely how the magic of Faery worked, it would no longer be Faery, but only a peculiar, perhaps imaginary, corner of our cold world. Tolkien's task is precisely the opposite. "Faery contains many things besides elves and fays, and besides dwarfs, witches, trolls, giants, or dragons: it holds the seas, the sun, the moon, the sky; and the earth, and all things that are in it: tree and bird, water and stone, wine and bread." By showing us the walking forest of Fangorn and the stars over Kirith Ungol, Tolkien seeks to give back to stars and trees some part of that beauty and mystery that is by right theirs.

Whatever its purpose for Tolkien, the remoteness of religion in *The Lord of the Rings* strengthens its effect for us. A story set in the Catholic world in which Tolkien undoubtedly believed would not have moved us so deeply, although that world is as much a moral universe as Middle Earth. We all know that the Pope is not infallible, that priests have no supernatural powers, that Catholicism is a superstition of uneducated or self-deceiving people. These things may or may not be true, but we know them. Catholicism, indeed Christianity, is part of our world, and a part that has been, for most of us, debunked. Tolkien's friends and contemporaries, C. S. Lewis and Charles Williams, wrote stories set in the modern world as seen by a believing Christian; they seem more fantastic than Tolkien's and less believable.

I have now given at least a partial answer to the puzzle of Tolkien's success. We hunger for meaning, value, pattern, a universe that, morally speaking, makes sense. One of the functions of religion is to satisfy that hunger. For most of us, whatever church we do or do not attend, religion is dead and we are starving. We attempt to fill the void, often with patterns less sophisticated and less plausible than those we have abandoned —political crusades, environmental fanaticism, Hare Krishna. Tolkien gives us instead what we desperately want, in the form of an imaginative creation of great power and subtlety. Escape, as Tolkien has himself written, is not necessarily a bad thing; it depends on what you are escaping from. But he intended his work to be more than merely a fantasy within which one

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takes refuge from the real world. He intended it rather as a vehicle for what he called recovery, a way in which, through the imaginative creation, we could see the nature of the world in which we live, a world both beautiful and perilous. Tolkien did not, of course, believe that the accidents of the world he had created were literally true, despite the loving scholarship he lavished on them. Nor was he in any sense writing allegory. Rather he tried to create a world which was in its essence true, and through which we could see our own world, not as custom and stale familiarity taught us to see it, but as he believed it to be.

ENOLA GAY, by Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan Witts. Stein and Day, 327 pp., $11.95.

THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE ATOMIC BOMB, edited by Anthony Cave Brown and Charles B. MacDonald. Dell Publishing Co., 582 pp., $5.95.

How we learned to stop worrying

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

"I *WASN'T EMOTIONALLY INVOLVED* [in dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima]—I was only following orders," declared Brigadier General Paul Tibbets recently. Tibbets, now retired, piloted the *Enola Gay* when it dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima 32 years ago. Then, he and his crew were heroes to Americans, who welcomed the A-bomb attacks against the hated Japanese. In the intervening years, however, attitudes in America have shifted sharply. Overseas, where nonwhites have always suspected racism as a motive for using the bomb against Japan, early resentment has gradually boiled over into outrage. Upon arriving in India on a military mission a decade ago, Tibbets was greeted by headlines branding him "the world's greatest killer."

The horror of the two bombings, which left more than 110,000 dead and 130,000 injured, has inspired a flood of literature in the past three decades. So many questions have demanded consideration: Why were the bombs dropped? Were they necessary? Were there other ways to end the war as quickly? Did racism make Japan the target? Would Roosevelt have chosen differently? Were the bombs used to intimidate Russia and did they thus help produce the Cold War? Would the American people have endorsed the use of the bombs if they had known about the Manhattan Project (code name for the A-bomb program) and how close Japan was to defeat even without it? Were American POWs killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Was the elaborate secrecy on the project necessary?

The most recent book on the bombings and on the events leading to them has received the accolade of "definitive" from its two British authors, who term themselves "modern historians." Unfortunately, their claims are vastly exaggerated, for their book skims past many important questions, disregards recent scholarship, and misses significant sources. It is jazzy journalism, full of invented conversation, colorful anecdote, and spicy tidbits. It is laden with minor "human interest" discoveries: Tibbets and his flight crew carried cyanide pills; the security-conscious Manhattan Project discovered some escaped convicts, including three murderers, who had sought refuge in the support forces of the 509th Composite Group (Tibbets's outfit); and one of his aces borrowed a special B-29 for a dangerous joy ride to New York.

Full of the foibles and heroics of the 509th, this book celebrates—and thus offers an implicit moral defense of—the atomic bombings. The fact that it helps assuage the guilt felt by an uneasy American public may explain the volume's place on some best-seller lists. The authors, however, do not provide an argued defense of the bombings but, rather, one insinuated by tone, dialogue, and the choice of events and anecdotes.

*IN CONTRAST, THE THOMAS-*Witts promotional campaign for the book, with interviews in 38 American cities, has not been subtle but blunt: Tibbets is right; Americans should not feel guilty about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "It is misplaced guilt," the authors declare. To strengthen their case, they have cavalierly decided that about half of the 80,000 Hiroshima dead were soldiers. No matter that an American report, recently declassified and reprinted in *The Secret History,* places only 9000 Japanese soldiers at Hiroshima, about 4000 of whom were killed.

Many of the other 76,000 casualties were women and children. But civilians were not "innocent," the authors contend, because nearly everyone between 13 and 65 "was involved in the war effort." That argument, with variations, has become an important moral justification for total war: An entire nation is involved in the war, and thus civilians, as productive labor, are the sinews of the army. This kind of argument marked the important transformation of morality that occurred during World War II: Civilians became morally legitimate targets. Whereas the bombing of Shanghai and Guernica outraged people, the bombings of Hamburg and Dresden a few years later, which took a much greater toll of life, were met with enthusiasm. Accepting total war, leaders and people both had grown to relish the intentional slaughter of enemy civilians. Few protested this new morality.

The authors claim as their own discovery what others uncovered a few years ago: The bomb killed some of the 23 American POWs at Hiroshima. How many? At least two, according to the book; at least seven, according to the authors in interviews. They charge the American government with keeping "the POW information locked up." They are right about the Pentagon, for it has been conveniently evasive, claiming not to know whether any American POWs were killed in the attack and explaining, lamely, that the lack of "death certificates" (burned in a 1973 fire) makes any official statement impossible. Apparently neither Pentagon spokespeople nor the authors know that an Army telegram of October 9, 1945, declassified in 1970, reports that 18 American POWs "being held in Hiroshima at time of atomic bombing . . . were killed instantly" and that two others died shortly thereafter "as a result of wounds sustained in bombing."

Would American leaders have knowingly dropped the A-bomb on American, or even allied, POWs? Yes, but they preferred not to. They chose Hiroshima as the primary target for the first bomb because they believed it was the only major Japanese city, and certainly the only one of the four A-bomb targets, without a POW camp. The intelligence reports, as we now know, were wrong. General Leslie Groves, commander of the Manhattan Project, had briefly considered substituting three other cities—Osaka, Amagasaki, and Omuta—for Nagasaki, because of its POW camp. Either he changed his mind, or he was overruled, for Nagasaki was the secondary target for the second bomb ("Fat Man"), which killed about 16 Dutch POWs near the heart of the city. Had the bomb been dropped a few thousand yards farther toward the bay, about 1000 POWs, in another camp, would have died.

DID RACISM LEAD TO THE USE of the A-bomb against Japan? That important question receives only passing mention from Thomas and Witts. Declassified evidence indicates that the initial target was Germany, but that the target gradually shifted to Japan in 1943, when policy-makers concluded that the European war would end before the bomb could be ready. Racism did not influence that shift.

Last year, some additional information on the subject of targets became available, in the minutes of the May 5, 1943, Military Policy Committee of the Manhattan Project: "The general view [was that the bomb

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WARD SCHUMAKER

should be used] on a fleet concentration in the harbor of Truk. General Styer suggested Tokyo, but it was pointed out that the bomb should be used where, if it failed to go off, it would land in water of sufficient depth to prevent easy salvage. *The Japanese were selected as they would not be so apt to secure knowledge from it as would the Germans.*" (Emphasis added.)

Perhaps racism made it easier for American leaders to use the bombs against Japan. On the other hand, however, many scientists welcomed the use of the bomb against Germany and felt morally free to dissent when the target shifted to Japan. What would have happened if Groves had not concealed from them, for so long, Germany's lack of progress in building a bomb? By 1945, at the various A-bomb projects, there would have been more dissent by scientists. And J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Los Alamos project, and other strong advocates of dropping the bomb would not have been so successful in calming the doubts. Would that dissent have altered policy? Probably not. Yet it might have led more scientists to question the moral purity of their government; they then could not have simply explained the use of the bomb by blaming Groves and the Army.

Thomas and Witts recognize that, from the inception of the Manhattan Project, American policy-makers, including FDR, assumed that the bomb was a legitimate weapon; hence its combat use never raised moral questions for them. Unfortunately, the authors tuck that conclusion into a brisk narrative and therefore never build an interpretive framework: Because the bomb did not raise moral doubts, policy-makers were not looking for alternatives. Consequently, they easily rejected or never seriously considered such possibilities as a warning or noncombat demonstration; a guarantee of the emperor; pursuit of Japan's peace feelers; a delay until Russia entered the war; or stepped-up conventional war (more firebombings, or a naval blockade, or both).

To understand official thinking in 1945, we must remember—though Thomas and Witts omit the information—that Groves and others expected to drop a few (not just two) A-bombs and hoped that they would help compel Japan's surrender before the so-called small invasion, which was scheduled for about November 1, 1945, and involved abut 775,000 troops with possibly 30,000 casualties in the first month. No policy-maker expected Japan's capitulation within days of the two bombings. In fact, Secretary of War Henry Stimson was so unprepared that he was at the airport, leaving for a short vacation, when Japan's surrender offer of August 10 arrived in Washington.

WAS THE A-BOMBING OF JAPAN designed to intimidate the Soviets? Thomas and Witts avoid the question, but substantial evidence, drawn from recently declassified files, reveals the answer: Policy-makers expected that the bombings would help end the war with Japan and also frighten the Soviets, thus making them more tractable. Possibly FDR had entertained similar hopes. Certainly, his systematic policy of barring the Soviets from the Manhattan Project, while including the British, preserved the options for future "atomic diplomacy." That capacity was bequeathed to Truman.

America's wartime suspicion of the Soviet Union is a strong theme of *The Secret History*. Excerpted from a huge official history of the Manhattan Project, this new book is composed half of two studies that have long been declassified, and half of recently opened material. Despite the exaggerated claims on the book jacket, there are no dramatically new disclosures, only considerably more detail on the scientific, administrative, and political aspects of the project. All this was available to Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson about 20 years ago when they were preparing their rich official history *(A New World)* of the Manhattan Project.

The sections on security in *The Secret History* may raise the most questions. While there are no direct admissions here that Groves had mail opened and phones bugged, a fact established by other declassified materials, there are other frightening reminders of the power at home of a wartime government. There are brief references to surveillance, but none to the fact that Groves wanted to imprison Leo Szilard, the bold and abrasive physicist at the University of Chicago, and had actually drafted such an order.

By 1944, according to *The Secret History*, the Office of Censorship was checking on 370 newspapers and magazines to maintain adherence to its code of secrecy on matters atomic. Was such a blackout effective? Not always. An Asheville, North Carolina, editor concluded that the government was building an atomic weapon and called the project to ask for some U-235. The confidential secrecy directive had alerted him.

Russia, as Stimson and Roosevelt knew in 1943, had already learned of the secret project. Had Germany and Japan? Probably not. Yet, had the existence of the project been made public in 1944 or even in 1945, Japan would have learned of the successful test at Alamogordo in mid-July 1945. The question then arises, With this knowledge would her militarists then have been willing to surrender without the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

In the postwar years, secrecy has often been irrational. Why could most of the manuscript, from which *The Secret History* is largely drawn, not have been declassified after Hiroshima? The thousands of recently opened pages contained no valuable secrets. Yet, even now, the same policy of excessive caution and bureaucratic arrogance continues. Consider, for example, the question of how many atomic bombs the United States had in 1946, or 1949, or 1955. Despite the pleas of scholars, such information remains classified on grounds of "national security." Do Americans sleep more comfortably knowing that their government zealously protects them from such knowledge of their recent past? ❑

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THE GIANTS: Russia and America, by Richard J. Barnet. Simon and Schuster, 190 pp., $8.95.

THE DIPLOMACY OF DETENTE: The Kissinger Era, by Coral Bell. St. Martin's Press, 270 pp., $12.50

The economics of détente

WALTER LAFEBER

*AMERICANS, OR AT LEAST AMER*ican publishers, are apparently becoming as addicted to books on détente and Henry Kissinger as they are to works on self-improvement. Perhaps this is because the two types of books are sometimes interchangeable. Détente develops character, demonstrates maturity. That Wizard from the Old World (and from Nelson Rockefeller's stable of intellectuals) has taught naive Americans how to cope with their limitations. One has the feeling that if Wayne Dyer had not used it first, some ambitious journalist would entitle a book analyzing why Kissinger went cold turkey on Vietnam, *Our Erroneous Zone*. (*Looking Out for Number One*, however, would have to be saved for Kissinger's autobiography.)

But we buy self-help books to learn how to expand, not contract, our power. Similarly, détente and Kissinger's policies can be popular only as long as they enlarge American influence. As President Carter complains, we do not take kindly to being reminded of our limits, especially in such areas as gasoline supplies and isthmian canals. South Vietnam could be more easily sacrificed after the United States had politically exploited Soviet wheat needs, the China market, Communist embarrassments in the human-rights area, Egypt's disaffection with Moscow, and the CIA's affection for the Chilean military. But when foreign affairs began to sour after 1974, as Coral Bell writes, "the major problems of negotiation for Dr. Kissinger . . . were neither with allies nor with adversaries, but with Congress. This was inevitable in the political and constitutional circumstances." (p. 48.)

And, she might have added, in the economic circumstances. The most important fact about détente is not the supposed American discovery that small is better, but that the ascendancy of détente coincided with the decline of Western economic power. The political risks of accepting setbacks in Angola or arms agreements increase appreciably if these events are accompanied by an 8 percent inflation rate and a steady stream of Japanese steel imports. Bell observes that Kissinger was more viciously attacked by the Right than by the Left in the United States. She provides a key to this by noting that the Right in this case was Henry Jackson, his Boeing constituency, and the mass of American laborers who have coincidentally suffered numerous economic setbacks since Kissinger began flying to Moscow and Peking.

George Meany can justifiably complain that for journalists, academicians, and ambitious foreign-policy tacticians a policy of very practical self-help and books praising détente are one and the same, but for many wage earners the old Cold War seemed more profitable and less ambiguous morally. Bell is a Fellow at Australian National University, likes Kissinger personally, and contemplates balances of power instead of wage contracts. She faults Kissinger only on isolated tactical moves, not strategy. Bell quotes Milovan Djilas who predictably prophesies that détente will lead to the collapse of the Soviet bloc. She finds virtue in Kissinger's blood-soaked evacuation from Vietnam because she believes it was helpful for détente (meanwhile, she refuses to discuss the ton-a-minute saturation bombing conducted between 1969 and 1973); she can claim a silver lining for the disastrous Cyprus affair by arguing that détente at least limited possibilities for Soviet involvement.

RICHARD BARNET, A FORMER member of the Kennedy administration before co-founding the Institute for Policy Studies, is too skeptical and attuned to domestic realities to follow Bell this far, but he also approves of many détente policies. His book is the more readable of the two, primarily because he conducted interviews in Washington and Moscow. His critical, jargon-free chapter on the arms race and SALT talks is superb. It alone is worth the book's price.

Yet if Barnet and Bell generally agree on the outlines of détente, they differ fundamentally in approach. Bell is concerned with broad international relations. She emphasizes détente as at least a triangular affair and even has a chapter on Australia as a somewhat confused and involuntary participant. Barnet concentrates on U.S.-USSR bilateral relations, narrowing this focus until he sees the two powers as "chess players in the dark." For Barnet, détente has been useful in allowing the "players" to understand the rules and each other: "Indeed, the range and depth of [personal] contacts is perhaps the crucial distinguishing feature of the new stage in U.S.-Soviet relations." (p. 11.)

Barnet understands the economic bases and results of détente better than Bell. His chapter on "The Business of Peace" is a crisp synthesis of the grain and technology deals that were both leavening and leverage in American policy. But his primary interest seems to be at the bureaucratic and policy-making levels. Parts of the book sound like the excellent chapter on the bureaucracy in his earlier *Roots of War*. The crisis in American international trade that began in the late 1950s, accelerated between 1967 and 1971, and reached a climax after 1973 is not analyzed in detail. The co-author of *Global Reach* (as Barnet is identified on the front of the book) could certainly make such an analysis, but it is not in this volume.

It might well be that détente resembles chess less than it does Monopoly. Between 1945 and the late 1960s, the apparent winner accumulated property, partly by foreclosing the mortgage on the Baltic Avenues of the British and French colonial empires. But after the mid-1960s at least, the property began to move into the hands of new players from the Middle East or to lose value as a result of mismanagement. That economic decline combined with the Soviet drive toward nuclear parity, and the result—as both Nixon and Kissinger realized

CHRISTOPHER COREY

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by the 1968 presidential campaign—was the need for some accommodation with the Soviets and, therefore, the Chinese. Détente resulted in early political and diplomatic triumphs, but did little to cure the basic economic problems. Because of that failure, the American consensus for détente remained fragile and even began to splinter. The Trilateralists in the Carter administration who thought they could substitute a Bonn-Washington-Tokyo axis for the Moscow-Washington-Peking relationship have done no better either in solving the West's economic downturn or rebuilding the domestic consensus.

We need no more books for a while on U.S.-USSR relations in the 1970s (Barnet has given us an admirable account), or on the international concert of power in the early and later stages of détente (Bell probably cannot be surpassed). We do, however, need an analysis of how the economic crisis beginning in the late sixties led to a decline of American power relative to other, particularly Third World, nations, and why some domestic groups have wanted to ditch détente no matter how much Old World realism and books on Positive Thinking they have been exposed to. In addition to a cool, modern-day Walter Lippmann, we badly need a Brooks Adams or a Thorstein Veblen to give us another perspective on the causes, content, and effects of détente.

CHINESE SHADOWS, by Simon Leys. Viking Press, 220 pp., $10.00.

Watching the China watchers

W. J. F. JENNER

WHY IS IT SO HARD TO THINK straight about China? Normally merciless critics of society will gag mind and mouth when it comes to the People's Republic. Whether it is because of some sense of guilt stemming from history—earlier aggressions in East Asia for Europeans, the more recent events in Indochina for Americans—or whether it is because Chinese officials have ways of making us accept their sense of the desirability of belonging to orthodoxy, I do not know; but even now I feel uneasy at stating in public some such incontrovertible fact as that most Chinese peasants are virtually tied to the land. It is not just the fear of never getting another visa, for one cannot even think of writing honestly about contemporary China while trying to keep on good terms with the country's rulers. It is rather a reluctance to wound the religious sensibilities of one's Chinese friends about the sacred notion of China. The love of China becomes too easily a silent passion.

It thus took courage to write this book, which came out in Paris with a bang as a cheap paperback three years ago. *Ombres chinoises* shocked and excited because it said things that could not be decently said in public before. Since then, and in large part because of that book, the climate of discussion of China in France has changed. Its barbs wounded, and since they were tipped not with malice but with the author's painful sincerity, they cured some of their victims. The tone of China-reporting in *Le Monde*, for example, has improved enormously; and the independent Left now looks at the Peking regime more coolly and skeptically.

Even though *Chinese Shadows*, the long-delayed English-language version of the book, has already attracted much fashionable attention and been endorsed by leading liberal Establishment figures, it should not be ignored. The journey on which it is based was made five years ago, and the book was written four years ago. It has not been noticeably rewritten, save for the occasional extra footnote, for the American edition. Yet time has confirmed many of its judgments and predictions. It marks a stage in the development of Western attitudes to China—the end of innocence.

It will probably be the more effective in the United States for appearing now. In 1974 our European inhibitions about criticizing China's rulers had long needed shaking up, but American needs were different then. After decades of unremitting official hostility to China, culminating in the hideous Indochina adventure, it was not adulation of the People's Republic but blind hatred of it that had to be reconsidered.

Americans were suddenly very receptive to the good points of a society from which they had allowed themselves to be isolated for more than 20 years. The grotesque images of a hell on earth that had been part of the war propaganda were discarded so fast that there was no time to ask why they had been accepted for so long. In their place an instant myth of impossibly good, wise, and uniform Chinese, speaking with one voice, was created in many reports of visits to Peking. The ugly yellow bastards of the last two American wars in Asia were magically transformed by guilty conscience into supermen and superwomen. This was progress, but it fell far short of recognizing the full humanity of the Chinese.

THE YEAR 1976 SEEMS TO HAVE been when popular American perceptions of China began to acquire some depth. The naked struggle for power before and after Mao's death; the contrast between the mood of the demonstrators in T'ien-an-men Square in early April, the dragooned but unenthusiastic marchers turned out to greet the fall of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and the evident delight with which the arrest of Chiang Ch'ing and her friends was celebrated in the big cities; the savagery of political and personal abuse in official and private polemic; and the revelations of violent disagreements within the system all made even casual observers realize that neither Chinese society nor its rulers could be quite as wonderful as initial enthusiasm may have suggested. Hence, in part, the eagerness with which *Chinese Shadows* has been welcomed in 1977.

When "Simon Leys" visited China in 1972, it was not as a political innocent. He is a Belgian Sinologist who had already used the *nom de plume* for his *Les habits neufs du président Mao*, a debunking of some accepted notions about the "cultural revolution." He was not hostile either to China or to the revolution that overthrew the old order in 1949: On his first visit in 1955 he had felt and responded to a mood of liberation, hope, and steady progress. His involvement in Chinese life and culture is neither recent nor shallow.

No doubt he did not expect to like everything he saw. It was frustrating but predictable that his contact with a country he loved should be restricted to a closely supervised itinerary along which gaggles of foreign visitors are hustled between set-piece visits, song-and-dance performances by schoolchildren, and compulsory banquets. What drove him to fury was the behavior of so many visitors, who managed to combine a lack of curiosity about people and things Chinese with a pathetic willingness to take down in their notebooks and repeat as best they could afterwards the clichés with which they were regaled.

The resulting book is mordant with anger. Anger not with the people of China, but at the Uncle Tom acts they are forced to put on for visitors and at the gratuitous connivance of intelligent foreigners, who should know better, in the obvious absurdities of Maoist orthodoxy. He did not set out to write a balanced, fair-minded account, assuming that his readers would already know some of the books by enthusiasts. He was not trying to discredit the Chinese Revolution as such (unlike the purveyors of American-accepted wisdom on China in the 1950s and 1960s), only to fill in the darker shades of the pictures that had been painted in unrelieved bright colors by Maoists and fellow-travelers. Perhaps it is unregenerate to prefer awkward truths to convenient lies and to ask the cost of the People's Republic's great achievements. But it cannot do the slightest harm to a state that is now a nuclear power, nor can it hurt

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us to come to terms with the China that actually exists instead of a land of fantasy and to recognize the damage Mao caused in his last years.

Chinese Shadows must be read. Leys's more recent collection of essays, *Images brisées* (Paris, Robert Laffont), takes some of its points further, and is also well worth obtaining. Of course it would be quite wrong to accept uncritically everything Leys says; the last thing we need is yet another China orthodoxy. There are no comfortable and reliable general truths about that country, and given the wretched trickle of information, on most issues we can do little more than ask questions. ❏

THE FABIANS, by Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie. Simon and Schuster, 446 pp., $12.95.

The earnestness of being important

JOSEPH R. STROMBERG

IN THE FABIANS, *NORMAN AND* Jeanne MacKenzie chronicle the political and personal lives of the early Fabians from the founding of the society in 1884 to World War I. The three outstanding "Old Guard" Fabians, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and George Bernard Shaw, gradually come to dominate the text, just as they dominated Fabianism. A wealth of anecdotal material on the Webbs, Shaw, and others makes for interesting and easy reading of this longish book. Although at times the historical context recedes into a backdrop, the authors generally hold a nice balance between biography and history. Indeed, they almost arm-twist one into sympathizing with these social engineers and rather constipated Victorian hippies, including the overserious Webbs and the brilliantly erratic Shaw.

The Victorian consensus was crumbling when the Fabian Society was formed. The great Gladstonian Liberal Party divided internally, eventually coming to grief over "social reform," tariffs, imperialism, and Ireland. Socialist ideas were in the air—those of Comte, Marx, Ruskin, and Morris—and activists called for a new labor politics. It was an age of Social Imperialism, a key concept that the MacKenzies don't explore.

Social Imperialism, not only in England, but in Germany, France, and elsewhere in those pre-1914 days, was a means by which paternalists of both Left and Right sought to reorder domestic society and sustain Empire abroad. The Fabians were right in the middle of the Social Imperialist trend and hoped to be its British brain trust. The first Fabians were mostly civil servants and unsuccessful businessmen whose dislike of trade went together with a belief in the saving mission of government experts. Their ideas, temperaments, and backgrounds ideally suited them for the self-appointed task of achieving maximum "National Efficiency."

The MacKenzies lay considerable stress on the religious background of the leading Fabians, who tended to come from evangelical homes. When they abandoned religion in the face of science, evolution, and Darwin, their inherited moralism sought secular outlets such as positivism, which in turn readied them for authoritarian socialism. The sad turn of latter-day Benthamite Radicalism toward the positive state was another influence. The conception of society finally generated by Benthamism and positivism was surprisingly unsophisticated. Society was a machine, it seemed, and the experts, armed with factual data, would do good by using the state to better align the machine's parts.

Social engineering was the Fabian way. Their attitude toward poverty was characteristic. The state was a benign, neutral tool to be used to eliminate poverty as soon as the "studies" demonstrated the best line of attack. That the state with its wars, taxes, regulations, and restrictions on trade could have something to do with causing poverty never occurred to the Fabians. At an earlier time, Radicals like Richard Cobden and John Bright—autodidactic businessmen who had a shrewd idea of how society really works—would have made such a connection. But if the Fabians agreed totally on any one thing it was the abandonment of classical liberalism and the earthbound business ethos at home and abroad.

*THE FABIANS' PRACTICAL POLI-*tics reflected their elitism. Disdainful also of the working-class activists of the trade unions and embryonic socialist parties, they sought to reform England through "permeation," working with and influencing people and parties already in power or likely to get there. There is an amusing side to the MacKenzies' account of permeation, an endless round of tedious, self-sacrificing dinner parties, meetings, and discussions, which ended in general failure when the Fabians repeatedly bet on the wrong set of politicians. Ultimately, the Fabians found themselves the brain trust of a Labour Party they had never especially cared for.

The Fabians' chief success lay in the long-run influence of their ideas and programs, which were an internally consistent set of piecemeal reforms all going in the direction of state interference with every aspect of life. The "National Minimum," "National Efficiency," and—most significant—an "Imperial Race" were slogans underlining Fabian concern with order and power. Within the society itself, the Old Guard considered their top-down leadership perfectly natural. The MacKenzies show that this was the case, but unlike, for instance, Josephine Fishel Milburn, another student of Fabianism, they show little concern that the Webbs' domination drove out too many potential leaders.

*THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECO-*nomics also enhanced the Fabians' prestige. Financed by a legacy from a wealthy member of the society, and with a subsidy from the London County Council (engineered by Sidney Webb, who served on it), the school became a world-famous center of research and thinking. Sidney Webb, the driving force behind the school, clearly understood the importance of winning the intellectuals over to the Fabian *Weltanschauung*.

Up to his neck in clever paradoxes, George Bernard Shaw carried on the war of ideas in his many plays. Mixing evolution, socialism, and Nietzsche, Shaw promoted the idea of the socialist Superman who would *force* society to develop in the most favorable direction. His embarrassing defense of Italian fascism and Mussolini followed logically from his Fabian views, as did the Webbs' elaborate apologias for Stalinism. Shaw's advocacy of (for those days) radical views on sex and marriage highlights one of the paradoxes that *The Fabians* brings out. As a group, the Fabians tended to the individualistic and sexually irregular (whether in the direction of promiscuity or celibacy didn't seem to matter). Yet, intent as they were on tightly restricting liberty, they believed in such freedom only for the superior elite. It was Shaw, too, who shocked even fellow Fabians by defending the odious Boer War, on the ground that small states were just in the way. For Shaw and the Webbs, larger units of power were better than smaller ones any day.

That the major bias of the Fabians was toward authoritarian measures is illustrated by Beatrice Webb's suggestion in her famous *Minority Report to the Poor Law Commission* that "industrial malingerers" be sent to severe detention colonies if they declined to work (as it turned out, she was never one to gag on Gulag). Her favorable evaluation of Mormon polygamy likewise rested on grounds not, say, of religious liberty, but on the fact that here had been the possibility of a marvelous experiment in eugenics—the breeding of a superior race. Throughout the entire Fabian worldview, leaving people alone was the one option they never deigned to consider, much less the notion that people had a *natural right* to be left alone. Hilaire Belloc was surely on target when he wrote

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that such reformers would only bring about a servile state.

The great radical individualist thinker Auberon Herbert once told Beatrice that she and Sidney would "do a lot of harm and be happy doing it." Truer words were never spoken. Part of the evidence is the admission by Beatrice Webb, spoken sheepishly (one hopes), toward the end: "Old people," she said, "often fall in love in extraordinary and ridiculous ways—with their chauffeurs, for instance: We felt it more dignified to have fallen in love with Soviet Communism."

More dignified. The words speak volumes on the bent Fabian view of what political struggle, love, and human dignity are all about. ❑

THE WAY OF DISCOVERY: An Introduction to the Thought of Michael Polanyi, by Richard Gelwick. Oxford University Press, 200 pp., $12.95.

Estimating Polanyi

ALAN RYAN

IT IS ALMOST AS TEMPTING TO describe Michael Polanyi as one of the most overestimated thinkers of recent years as it is to describe him as one of the most underestimated thinkers of our time. It is, of course, hard to see how one could overestimate the talents of a man who had a strikingly successful career in physical chemistry, in Budapest, Berlin, and Manchester; who, even while holding a chair in chemistry, had become a very considerable authority on the social and economic organization of the Soviet Union; and who embarked on a second career as philosopher of science, social theorist (where his major work was *The Logic of Liberty*), and architect of a new metaphysics.

In his second career—which the University of Manchester recognized by giving him a personal chair in social theory in 1948, but which he had been nourishing since the 1920s—Polanyi tackled some of the most intractable issues in all these varied fields. What connection is there between the practice of science and the maintenance of a free society? Is it an accident that the way in which scientific research is usually written up systematically misreports the processes by which scientists come to their discoveries? Does science somehow show that men are merely elaborate physico-chemical systems—or that they are so elaborate that it is a sort of superstition to think of them as merely anything? Is it an inescapable conclusion of the march of science that the universe is a cold, unfeeling, unhomelike place, in which humanity just happens to have found a temporary niche?

In more overtly political contexts, Polanyi was deeply concerned with phenomena that are by any standard extraordinary: Why was it that Marxism, when put into practice as the ideology of Stalinist Russia, derided all talk of morality as mere bourgeois mystification, and yet called on the fanatical loyalty of its adherents, who employed the most old-fashioned and unabashed moral terminology in denouncing, for instance, the treachery of Trotskyist wreckers. And how did Nazism come to persuade ordinary, decent men actively to assist in administering a system of mass extermination? How, for that matter, did a man like Himmler, who was taken ill when he forced himself to witness one of the mass executions he had ordered, still follow a policy that was a mixture of the deepest moral cynicism and the extremest moral fanaticism?

At a rather more everyday level, too, Polanyi constantly chewed over the familiar liberal problems: A society without ideals was intolerable, and a society that tried to realize all its ideals immediately was sure to degenerate into terrorism. But how can we live with the knowledge that we must pursue our ideals, yet always in a spirit of moderation, and in the knowledge that they may be forever unattainable? Again, the liberal requires the rule of law and demands legal safeguards, yet liberalism deplores inequalities of power and does not share the conservative assumption that whatever is well entrenched is best. Must liberals, then, put up with the fact that the defense of freedom will have conservative consequences? In *Personal Knowledge,* Polanyi reluctantly concludes that they must.

RICHARD GELWICK'S LITTLE book is an addition to the evidence that, in some quarters at least, Polanyi is not only too highly regarded, but treated with the reverence due to beings higher than mere men. Gelwick is an illuminating and generally lucid guide to what is distinctive in Polanyi's understanding of the history and methodology of science; he is at any rate interesting, though to my mind both long-winded and ultimately obscure, in his account of what Polanyi meant by "tacit knowing" and what his "heuristic philosophy" amounted to; and he has certainly provided a useful introductory book for anyone who is curious about Polanyi. It's hard to imagine any of his readers putting down *The Way of Discovery* without at least some desire to read Polanyi's *Personal Knowledge,* or the shorter lectures collected in *Science, Faith and Society* and *The Study of Man.* Nonetheless, I fear that the moderately skeptical reader will end the book quite as doubtful as when he started—with science and religion unreconciled, with the contrast between the world's brute factuality and humanity's evaluation of it quite as stark as ever. The messianic tone that sometimes creeps into Polanyi's work, and the hagiographic style of Richard Gelwick's introduction to it, are likely between them to send the skeptic scurrying back to the agnosticism of Hume, Mill, and Russell.

Still, it would be a pity if that was all. For Polanyi set out to do something very worthwhile in his account of the social implications of scientific inquiry. The orthodoxy of recent years has been to contrast the psychological conditions of discovery—which are an empirical question of the sort of mental set that assists its possessor to spot workable and elegant theories—with the logical requirements of verifying or falsifying what the scientist claims to be true. Polanyi closes this gap, a gap on which the work of Karl Popper is, so to speak, built, by claiming that science would simply be unintelligible as an activity if scientists did not bring all sorts of skills, all sorts of assumptions, and all sorts of epistemological, ontological, and even moral commitments to the task of discovery. Science is a matter of finding a rational order in the world; we find it only by being passionately committed to its presence; the finding is a personal achievement of a highly skilled kind. The claim that its presence is a characteristic of reality in itself is not entirely intelligible, since that reality is unknown, and yet the assumption must be made that it is the rational structure of reality that we discover, and that genuine discovery is valid for all inquirers, not just the man who happens to make it.

How can we live with the knowledge that we must pursue our ideals, and the knowledge that they may be forever unattainable?

These assumptions are sustained by the scientist's membership in a community of like-minded explorers. Unlike Thomas Kuhn, the most famous of Sir Karl Popper's critics, whose account of scientific progress makes the scientific community look like a

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totalitarian state stumbling from one stifling orthodoxy to the next, Polanyi accepts a measure of conservative resistance to a change in world view as a proper part of an ethic which also, and more importantly, encourages independence and boldness in the scientist and teaches him how to use them. In this fashion, the notion that a concern for truth and a strong sense of one's obligation to report truthfully on reality are essential elements in liberalism—and essential defenses against the fanaticism of the Stalinist or Nazi state—is a central part of Polanyi's philosophy of science and his political theory alike. Whether this amounts to the defense of a rather bleak liberalism, or to something richer and more like a rationalist successor to the consolations of religion, is another matter, and one on which my response to *Personal Knowledge* is personal agnosticism.

SENSUAL DRUGS: Deprivation and Rehabilitation of the Mind, by Hardin B. Jones and Helen C. Jones. Cambridge University Press, 354 pp., $15.95 cloth, $3.95 paper.

Drugs, sex & pseudoscience

JOEL FORT

WITH SO MANY ACCURATE and authoritative books on drug usage and its effects receiving little or no recognition, it is unfortunate that a piece of such poorly written, poorly organized fiction as Hardin and Helen Jones's *Sensual Drugs* was ever published, and unfortunate indeed that the book's erotic title will not only increase its sales but also encourage further drug use—both through misrepresentation.

Strewn throughout this collection of anecdotal observations and antidrug (or, most frequently, antimarijuana) polemics are often confused, incomplete, inaccurate, and even contradictory accounts of brain functioning, sex, drug abuse, rehabilitation, and marijuana usage. The authors display their bias through the observations they choose to report, belaboring the pathological findings while ignoring the far greater number of normal ones. This pattern is maintained even in the bibliography, which omits balanced books and articles but cites, for instance, Senator James O. Eastland.

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The inanities, non sequiturs, and irrelevancies that fill *Sensual Drugs* could be considered amusing reading were it not for the fact that they will be accepted as gospel by many who will be overly impressed by the credentials of one of the authors (Hardin Jones is professor of physiology and medical physics at the University of California, Berkeley) and the astonishing publication of the book by a respectable press. Here are a few examples of the kind of stuff that is endlessly repeated: "Because many drugs produce a sexlike pleasure, there is a close relationship between drug-taking and sex"; "drugs, notably marijuana and the opiates, diminish sexual dreaming"; "the marijuana user is susceptible to any sexual invitation and lacks the will to resist"; "enlarged breasts have been observed in some male marijuana users"; "tolerance to marijuana builds up rapidly"; "thwarted marijuana users may become aggressive"; "the Nepalese people, like those of other countries on the drug trail, were worried because their young were being introduced to drug use by foreign travelers." (To take up only this last ridiculous claim: In Nepal, as in India and Pakistan, *cannabis* is grown widely and has been used for centuries by people of all ages, both socially and medically. Thus, it was not left for the few thousand Americans and Europeans traveling through to "introduce" the young to marijuana.)

Sensual Drugs constantly employs the selective, one-dimensional, viewing-with-alarm approach to reporting data that could make the most innocuous or even healthful activity seem pathological. Even sexual intercourse or playing tennis, for instance, could be made to appear sinister by describing the participating individual as feverish (increased body temperature), hypertensive (increased blood pressure), dyspneic (rapid breathing), disheveled, or incoherent —and then calling for jail for the "bad" and hospitalization for the "mad."

In its own devious way, this book is as obsessed with sex as are the works of de Sade, Henry Miller, or Freud, although its literary merit is pallid by comparison. Perhaps Hardin Jones's brain has been adversely affected by his years of preoccupation with marijuana and sex, so that, as a result, his reasoning, judgment, and ethical values have been obliterated. If so, it would be one more sad case of "reefer madness," of barbarism toward fellow human beings who do something or represent something one disapproves of: madness not from the direct effects of marijuana, but from marijuana as symbol—of the devil, of forbidden pleasure, of youth, of freedom.

THE JONESES' PROPAGANDA effort also illustrates a growing problem facing the lay reader in coping with books, studies, and reports on what purport to be scientific investigations: how to evaluate the validity of the data and findings presented. Since our sensation-craving media, as well as many of our "scientific" journals, concentrate on loud assertions of abnormality and illness arising from the use of a limited number of drugs, the public must learn to judge such investigations on the basis of correct scientific methodology: the representativeness of the selected subjects ("random sample"); whether there was a well-chosen control group against which observations made on the "user" group could be weighed; whether the presence of other pertinent factors (pre-existing illness, use of drugs other than those in question, etc.) had been accounted for; the replicability of the results of one study by other investigators; whether the subjects were humans or laboratory animals; and consideration of the dosage levels involved (since many laboratory trials employ doses 10 to 100 times those encountered in normal use). Also to be taken into account are any prior biases of the authors. All these caveats apply to the "scientific" findings cited by Professor and Mrs. Jones.

Beyond these concerns is the question of correct reasoning on the social implications of the data and the conclusions. Even if it were true of marijuana (as it is of alcohol) that it produces brain damage, psychosis, addiction, etc., is sending people to prison for their private and personal use of the substance in any way desirable or life-enhancing? Is not this punishment worse than the "crime," the treatment worse than the "disease"?

This selective approach to reporting data could make an innocuous or even healthful activity seem pathological.

No drug, including caffeine, is totally harmless. And none can magically bring us sensuality, intelligence, insight, or success. Yet if one were to rank various drugs on a scale of zero to 10 for their inherent danger or potential for causing harm, I would rate caffeine at 1, marijuana at about 3, and tobacco and alcohol at around 9. A public policy that indiscriminately stigmatizes both user and seller of marijuana should be based on more than alleged findings of potential risks and dangers. Many things must be done concurrently, starting with the long overdue decriminalization of personal, private drug use.

Sensual Drugs represents the last dregs of the fanaticism widely displayed in the recent past by narcotics police, politicians, bureaucrats, and self-appointed drug experts seeking to rescue themselves from well-deserved obscurity. Don't buy this book and don't read it.

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ARTCULTURE: ESSAYS ON THE POST-MODERN, by Douglas Davis. Harper & Row, 175 pp., $10.00.

Art for their sake

ALAN GOWANS

ARTCULTURE IS A COLLECTION of essays by the distinguished art critic of *Newsweek,* Douglas Davis, written as *pièces d'occasion* for various symposia and openings of new art galleries, and as commissioned contributions to art magazines. It also contains a fairly long statement made by Davis at a hearing on H.R.7216 (which later became the 1975 Arts, Humanities, and Cultural Affairs Act), arguing the need for greater appropriations direct to artists, "the men and women who make the culture," that is, Artculture. The statement is all the more effective because Davis, a recipient of many grants, a highly paid speaker and critic, and therefore obviously one of "the men and women who make the culture," obviously is not in need of financial aid himself.

There is, as Irving Sandler observes in his introduction, a unity of thought running through all these pieces: "Postmodern" art, by contrast with the "formalism" of "modern" art, must somehow get in closer touch with "the people." Not quite so clear is the precise means Davis proposes for accomplishing this goal. For example, he would like to see television become a major art form in the future—that is to say, television conceived as an art experience of the sort he creates with his experimental video. Such a development would provide immensely personal and meaningful art in everyone's own living room, he thinks. Nobody could or would dispute his main thesis, or his goal of replacing what he calls the "mind-numbing effect of countless hours of prime-time comedy and household drama" with something better. The problem is, it's far from self-evident that replacing soap operas and family comedies with experimental video would in fact result in art getting in closer touch with the "people."

Nothing is more certain or more easily provable than the fact that television provides what Mr. Davis calls garbage for the people for no other reason than that the people want it. There are thousands, old and young, for whom the characters in soap operas are old and dear friends. There are all sorts of lonely individuals, transients, who find companionship and a sense of belonging from watching *All in the Family* or *Carol Burnett* year after year, in diverse places. Thousands, maybe millions more have their lives brightened by the likes of Lawrence Welk. Douglas Davis may not like this; enlightened people everywhere may join him in deploring it; but you cannot blame everything, as Davis implies, on "populism" as preached by Tom, the Big Bad Wolfe. Nor is this situation likely to be transformed by massive reeducation of public taste, a claim that used to be advanced with such passionate conviction in the 1950s but can no longer seriously be made.

After the French Revolution, the new political Establishment set up Jacques-Louis David as art dictator, empowered to impose his views and taste on every aspect of French cultural life—clothes, furniture, and candlesticks, as well as painting and theater. Sometimes it's hard to avoid an uncomfortable feeling that what really underlies the thought of critics like Davis, comparably become an Establishment by the successful avant-garde revolution of the 1955–1970 period, is not so much their conscious wish to put art in touch with the people, as an unconscious and unrecognized wish to impose their views on right art, held with such passionate conviction, upon the people. Time and again in these writings one detects a note of insecurity, an uneasy suspicion that somehow, despite near-total control of our whole educational apparatus for two decades and more, "Artculture" remains the province of a very small, self-elected group. ("What is Art? Art is what Artists say it is. Who are Artists? Artists are people who do Art.") Further, one can detect a fear that art is likely to remain in this restricted circle unless some means is found to forcibly spread it amongst the population at large, by some kind of government action—and a feeling that such government action, being taken in the people's own best interests, would be highly meritorious. (Throughout Davis's compelling piece on the virtues of experimental video, reminiscences kept coming to mind of *1984*'s telescreens that never could be switched off.)

Already social critics—George Grant in *Technology and Empire* is one example—have observed how the "avant-garde art Establishment," so far from representing any kind of rebellion against entrenched authority, in fact serves the purposes of that authority by drawing off steam from current discontents—directly, in the form of bread-and-circus subsidies; and indirectly, by conning artists into imagining boho posturings to be some kind of effective social criticism. It would be nice to report that the essays in *Artculture* allay such suspicions to some degree and provide a base for resolute opposition to *1984* trends or Stalinesque types of art dictatorship. Alas, that would hardly be true.

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WARTIME, by Milovan Djilas. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 470 pp., $14.95

Whose unvanquished army?

IVO BANAC

WESTERN READERS ARE ACcustomed to discovering in most of the works by Milovan Djilas revealing insights about Eastern Europe. An erstwhile leading functionary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), and for the last two decades Yugoslavia's best-known dissident, Djilas has surpassed all expectations in this newest work, wholly devoted to his country's dramatic history during World War II. It was then that the interplay among the various South Slav nationalities, political movements such as Communism and monarchism, and the military occupiers (the Germans, Italians, and others) created an immensely complicated situation, which scholars are still attempting to unravel.

On the face of it, the attention drawn to this fairly lengthy memoir might seem unwarranted. Despite claims to the contrary, the volume contains no major revelations. Nor is Djilas the first leader of the CPY's Partisan forces to set on paper harrowing remembrances of Yugoslavia's wartime inferno. (*Partizanija* is rather a sizable industry in Yugoslavia.) Those who might have expected a repudiation by Djilas of the CPY's strategic aims in the war will be disappointed. He is not even especially critical of Tito's leadership. What second thoughts he manifests on the merit of certain Partisan tactics are tempered with an air of tragic inevitability. Why, then, should this book be approached with the interest due a truly novel work?

The innovative ideas present in Djilas's *Wartime* are implicit, though nonetheless compelling. The entire tone of the book—the prosaic portrayal of the weaknesses, vanity, and bungling in Partisan headquarters, but especially the resigned presentation of the cruelties and excesses that the Partisans, no less than their opponents, committed—constitutes a new departure in the narratives of the period. Henceforth, it will be considerably more difficult to maintain that only Tito's vanquished enemies were guilty of misdeeds.

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Djilas, in short, has inaugurated a much-needed period of revision in the historiography of Yugoslavia's wartime experience. This is no mean achievement, especially if one considers the pains taken to safeguard "the idealized image of the leaders of the Yugoslav revolution" (p. 231) and, one might add, of the acolytes as well. Basing the state's legitimacy upon the canon of sacrosanct Partisan virtue, Yugoslavia's officialdom is understandably reluctant to experiment with demythologizing. But its disinclination may, in the long run, prove an ill-considered posture.

TWO EPISODES DESCRIBED BY Djilas are bound to kindle controversy. They are the Partisans' negotiations with the Wehrmacht and the postwar liquidations of captured (or repatriated) opponents of the Partisans. Both subjects are taboo in Yugoslavia, although the first event is rather a self-inflicted embarrassment: That only assorted "domestic traitors" had any dealings with the occupiers is an established mythopoeic embellishment.

The matter of postwar liquidations is far graver. "These senseless acts of wrathful retribution" (p. 447) are inextricably connected with the long-suppressed story of forced repatriations after the Second World War to the USSR and Yugoslavia. The bleak fate of the repatriates, many of them (but by no means all) admittedly members of various formations allied to the defeated Axis, was undersigned by the Western leaders, who could not have been unaware of what awaited those forced to return.

While all the governments involved would surely prefer to dim the memory of these horrifying events, reticence is far more pervasive in the East. No wonder that the demands for a full accounting are rarest precisely where they are needed most. Edvard Kocbek, a leading Slovene poet of left-Catholic orientation (who joined the Partisans and for a period held several high positions), recently provoked a furor in Yugoslavia by suggesting that the responsible officials release all the pertinent information and confess to their guilt.

Milovan Djilas, one of the highest officials when these events were occurring, does not respond to Kocbek's exhortation. He feels no personal responsibility for the mass killings, and minimizes (to what end?) the number of victims. But he *does* admit that "given the [CPY's] power structure and the chain of command, no one could have carried out such a major undertaking without approval from the top" (p. 449). This admission is significant, as is the fact that a CPY leader has for once acknowledged an act whose concealment remains one of the chief obstacles to a full reconciliation within, as well as between, Yugoslavia's principal nationalities.

Djilas's need to impress his (largely Western) readers with a liberal record is one of the reasons his disclosures frequently appear halfhearted. Nothing in this book, including Djilas's startling confession that he personally slaughtered a German prisoner (pp. 282–283), and certainly not his supposed vision of Christ (pp. 284–285), detracts from the self-image he seeks to establish. (It is more convincing to present oneself as culpable in particular while justified in general.)

A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THIS method is Djilas's attempt to dissociate himself from the Montenegrin ultraleftists during the period of the so-called "left errors" in 1941–1942. The "deviations" in question were extreme ultraleft outbursts within the framework of the CPY's already pronounced sectarianism, for instance the Montenegrin Partisans' liquidation of the "kulaks." Although he must know this to be false, Djilas states that the Montenegrin "left errors" contributed to the Serb royalist Chetniks siding with the German occupiers against Tito's men. In fact, the overall line of the CPY leadership was surely more influential in that regard, while the "left errors" simply swelled the Chetnik ranks. Actually, his role is reconstructed far more accurately in an (admittedly hostile) article by Djuro Vujović (*Istorijski zapisi* [Titograd], 1/1967).

One "sectarian" error is still not rectified in *Wartime*: A lack of tolerance for the pluralist nature of Yugoslavia's Partisan movement dominates the entire book. Djilas seems incapable of understanding, for instance, why the Croat Communists would want to draw closer to the mass-based Croat peasant party, the most influential (and most democratic) contingent of the Croat national movement. If Tito is to be praised for rejecting outside pressures and for insisting on pursuing his movement's own best interests (as he put it, "Well, they [the Russians] also think first of their own people and their own army!" [p. 231]), why should the Croat Communists be castigated for doing precisely the same? Nation and state are not the same in Eastern Europe, least of all in multinational Yugoslavia. Or does Djilas alone have the right to be a man of principle in some cases and in others a hard-boiled *Realpolitiker*?

Significant weaknesses do not, however, diminish this work's lasting value. If literary quality alone mattered, Djilas would have few detractors. The beauty of his starkly dramatic style is faithfully rendered in Professor Michael B. Petrovich's masterful translation. Djilas celebrates the epic heroism of his armed men (and even of the Germans) with much admiration. There is, however, an irony at work here. The shades of the Partisan dead, fallen on the river Sutjeska's gory strands, are invoked by Djilas as a mirror to the survivors now in power in Yugoslavia. As a result, the words of the Montenegrin Partisan song will ring hollow:

O Sutjeska, icy water,
whose unvanquished army
yesternight transversed your waves. . . .

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FILM

***SEMI-TOUGH*, directed by Michael Ritchie**

***THE MAN WHO LOVED WOMEN*, directed by François Truffaut**

Semi-delightful

STEPHEN HARVEY

*SATIRE HAS ALWAYS BEEN SOME*thing of an endangered species in the American film; other than Preston Sturges and Billy Wilder, there are few filmmakers indeed who have lampooned our native idiosyncrasies with consistent success. In this context, Michael Ritchie looms increasingly large as one of the most distinctive directors to emerge in the seventies thus far. In the past five years, Ritchie has focused his caustic gaze on such egregious American institutions as the modern political campaign (*The Candidate*), the teen-age beauty contest (*Smile*), and the Little League (*The Bad News Bears*). The results have been a little on the facile side at times, but there's no denying his adroitness at capturing the dogged competitiveness lurking behind the *bonhomie* of our great American pastimes.

In *Semi-Tough* we are on familiar Ritchie terrain—an America of bright shopping malls, dim cocktail lounges, and Astroturf, home and hearth a shrine of flocked wallpaper and Day-Glo naugahyde. Although ostensibly concerned with the world of professional football, its real target is the nationwide quest for instant nirvana in 10 easy lessons, via est, TM, and such. The so-called consciousness movement may not be much of a challenge for parody; to the heathens among us, the portentous doubletalk of Werner Erhard and his sort is ludicrous enough simply quoted verbatim. It's also arguable that *Semi-Tough* has come along about a year or two too late to be really topical. Nevertheless, Ritchie and screenwriter Walter Bernstein send up the whole business with just the right note of deadpan malice. Their Frankenstein creation, one "Friedrich Bismarck" (played by Bert Convy), is a plastic monument to homogenized smarminess, and probably the drollest lampoon since all those polyester jaycees who populated *Smile*.

The catch is that Ritchie and Bernstein have grafted their social broadsides onto a plot hearkening back to the screwball romances of 40 years ago. The story revolves around a blissed-out football player (Kris Kristofferson) who's found enlightenment, his earthbound teammate (Burt Reynolds) who knows he doesn't want it, and their wisecracking female pal (Jill Clayburgh), who can't make up her mind. As in *Design for Living*, the three cohabit in pure harmony until desire rears its alluring head, while all is eventually resolved in a *Philadelphia Story* last-reel switcheroo at the altar. Throughout, irony and charm keep battling it out for equal screen time, a tussle which Ritchie never quite manages to resolve because the two are absolutely at cross-purposes with each other. Parody requires quick reflexes and a touch of contempt for the boobs being spoofed; romantic comedy needs a somewhat more leisurely rhythm, so that the audience has a chance to warm up to the characters at hand.

The result is a kind of amiable chaos—*Semi-Tough* may well be Ritchie's most likable movie, but his usual hard-edged momentum is dissipated in the process. Thanks to its meandering structure and an editing job that tries to stitch all the conflicting strands together, the movie barely makes sense at times. Early on, the audience is prepared to view an est rally in Miami and ends up on a plane for Green Bay, Wisconsin; an elaborate gag is set up in one reel, only to be dropped and then clumsily resuscitated 20 minutes later. Ritchie himself seems more than a little baffled by all the confusion. Despite his penchant for knockabout humor, he completely fumbles the wedding ceremony free-for-all at the movie's climax—the kind of stock sequence any second-string TV-movie director could do via remote control.

Its real target is the quest for instant nirvana in 10 easy lessons.

Yet whatever *Semi-Tough* lacks in the realm of logic and finesse is largely compensated for by the casting of Burt Reynolds in the updated Cary Grant role. In the right sort of lighthearted vehicles, Reynolds is probably the most ingratiating star performer in current American movies. Like Grant, he manages to convey a sense of total relaxation to the camera and the audience, and his puckish air of skepticism extends past the script and the foibles of his movie comrades to include his own sexual prowess, thus taking the edge off all that masculine swagger. Reynolds's low-keyed comic skills have never been better exploited than in *Semi-Tough*, and the film also makes apt use of Kristofferson's opaque-eyed, burly spaciness. Jill Clayburgh is a little more problematic. She manages to strike the requisite balance of sweetness and forthrightness, while affecting a Texas chainsaw twang with great aplomb. At the same time, she's up against a script which insists upon this character's devastating physical appeal, and a cameraman who seems determined to prove otherwise. Nevertheless, she's been far better served here than in her two previous film outings, and the underplayed warmth generated between her and Reynolds is sufficient to make something semi-delightful out of *Semi-Tough*.

JUST AS SEMI-TOUGH IS A quintessentially American movie, Truffaut's *The Man Who Loved Women* couldn't be more prototypically Gallic if it tried. Where else but in a French movie would a protagonist's dual passion be for sex and *belles lettres*, with the latter almost winning the contest? The basic plot might be viewed as a kind of *Looking for Mr. Goodbar* in reverse; like Theresa Dunn, Bertrand (played by Charles Denner) spices up his humdrum daily life with profligate evenings, from which he always wakes up alone, by choice. While the relentless pursuit of carnal joy leads to a sorry demise in both cases, Truffaut is an unabashed humanist and Richard Brooks, director of *Goodbar*, a strident moralist, which makes a world (or at least a continent) of difference in terms of tone. Thankfully, Truffaut resists the temptation to turn this character into a searing general indictment of the decline of Western civilization. Rather, he's presented as a bitter-sweet eccentric—aberrant no doubt, but totally harmless save perhaps to himself. Intense, ferret-faced Denner is so enamored of women in the abstract that he can never connect for long with any one in particular. The pursuit is far more tantalizing than the object itself; the greater the challenge, the more mesmerized he becomes. In a certain sense he's the polar opposite of Truffaut's *Adele H.*, whose obsession for one man was so all-encompassing that no one else existed for her at all. Yet they're linked by the same driving impulses—clearly it's the basic nature of monomania that fascinates Truffaut, rather than the particular motivation at hand.

Many of the rapturous notices the film has received thus far have cited its warmth and charm, the two precise qualities which are completely lacking as far as I'm concerned. Almost everything about the film exudes a kind of wintry melancholy, from the brownish, muted color scheme to Den-

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ner's dour, introverted performance. One of France's most intelligent character actors, Denner has never displayed the requisite magnetism to sustain an entire film by himself (a point particularly underscored 15 years ago when Chabrol cast him in *Landru*, where, ironically enough, he played a literal lady-killer). Truffaut seems to have chosen Denner precisely because he's the antithesis of the stereotypically strutting Don Juan; it's a crucial point that women warm to him because of the desperate sincerity he exudes, rather than being melted by looks or bravado. Whatever the rationale, Denner's enervated presence and the film's relentlessly episodic structure drain *The Man Who Loved Women* of much of its vitality by the last few reels.

The film's saving grace is the array of vibrant performances Truffaut has elicited from Denner's long procession of conquests. Observed with neither mawkishness nor condescension, these women run the gamut from a brisk, lucid editor (Brigitte Fossey), who succumbs even though she sees his adolescent compulsion for what it is, to a manic housewife (Nelly Bourgeaud), who enjoys her adultery spiced with a *soupçon* of peril. Every one of them is portrayed with humor and insight—again, the contrast between these women and their Gothic case-history male counterparts in *Goodbar* is too obvious to be ignored. Obviously Truffaut is the one who really loves and wants to understand women, and the product of that fascination makes this movie the moderately satisfying experience it is.



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

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